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Abstract 
Social service delivery to refugees in the United States may vary depending on the 
different cultural and historical backgrounds that people bring with them to the 
resettlement process.  The Kunama ethnic group from Eritrea, who fled their country for 
refugee camps in Ethiopia, provide a particularly challenging case as they most often 
have limited English-language skills, no employment experience outside of farming and 
herding, and a complex political history.  This study contributes to the knowledge base of 
refugee resettlement and adjustment into the U.S.  To gain an understanding of 
challenges faced by refugees as they settle in the U.S., two Kunama refugees from 
Boston were interviewed to provide their own stories.  In addition, a literature review of 
the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, Kunama culture, and the refugee situation was 
conducted.  The findings are included.  The Kunama in the U.S. are faced with the 
challenges of finding jobs to become economically self-sufficient, limited access to 
furthering their education, language barriers in health care, and learning to navigate the 
American environment and way of life.  Culturally sensitive and informed social services 
are vital sources of support for equipping the Kunama and other refugees with 
transitional help in each of these areas, particularly in maintaining physical protection, 
well-being, and guarding against potential mental health problems. 
 
Keywords: Refugee, Kunama, Eritrea, Resettlement, Adjustment, Mental Health  
 
Abbreviations: IDPs: Internally Displaced Peoples, UNHCR: United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, UN: United Nations, OAU: Organization for African Unity, 
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Ethiopia, IRC: International Rescue Committee, NGOs: Non-governmental 
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Introduction 
 In a globalized world, humankind has developed a new kind of consciousness and 
a deepening awareness of global situations.  The media has brought volatile genocidal 
conflicts into the living room of suburban America, British music videos into rural Mali, 
and Chinese peasant farmers onto the televisions of wealthy Europeans.  This expansion 
into an age of greater universal brotherhood and sisterhood, when governmental 
interventions frequently cross nation-state borders and humanitarian aid workers travel 
worldwide, has created a more pressing need to increase individual awareness of 
international crises and a responsibility to act on those revelations.  Unfortunately, the 
sheer number of countries comprising the globe and the events that occur within them 
often contributes to personal feelings of powerlessness.  The media has unprecedented 
power in making choices that direct which global conflicts will be well-researched, 
covered in the news, and brought before the international community, and conversely, 
which ones will by default be ignored. 
 One such conflict that has been largely swept under the rug of international 
awareness is the continued instability between Eritrea and Ethiopia in the Horn of Africa.  
Although Eritrea officially gained independence from Ethiopia on May 24, 1993, the 
recently dissolved Ethiopia-Eritrea boundary commission left much disputed territory in 
the hands of Ethiopia.  Eritrea’s independence came after years of colonial subjugation, 
including both Italian and British governance, before being classified as Ethiopia’s 14th 
province in 19621.  As Africa’s 52nd nation-state struggles to make a name for itself 
                                                 
1
 Iyob, R. (1995). The Eritrean struggle for independence: Domination, resistance, nationalism, 1941-1993. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1. 
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independent of its giant neighbor to the South, little hope remains that the tension has 
passed, as neither side is satisfied with the current boundaries.   
 Within this backdrop of governmental suppression has emerged a microcosmic 
struggle for the minority Kunama group to gain the right to self-determination within 
Eritrea as a nation-state.  As an ethnic group largely believed to side with Ethiopia at 
times during the longest war in African history, the Kunama continue to grapple with 
their national identity today2.  External confusion persists about whether the Kunama are 
Eritrean or Ethiopian, and it remains difficult to place them into definitive categories.  
Through a long series of events, of the estimated 100,000 Kunama people in Eritrea 
today, over 4,000 have fled across the border into Ethiopia and taken up residence in the 
Shimelba refugee camp rather than remain at home.  Of these refugees, 1,200 of them 
have been referred to the United States (U.S.) by the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) to be considered for resettlement3.  This group offers a unique 
challenge to resettlement organizations due to their complex background and lack of 
English language skills.   
 After developing the historical context of Ethiopia and Eritrea in Chapter 1, I will 
explain the place of the Kunama within this context and then follow them into exile in 
Chapter 2: first in refugee camps in Ethiopia, and then in resettlement abroad.  Chapter 3 
focuses on resettlement in the United States, both because that is the context in which I 
have worked with Kunama refugees, and because it is the country where most of the 
Kunama have been resettled.  As a place of asylum for the Kunama, it is pertinent to 
                                                 
2
 Pateman, R. (1998). Eritrea: Even the stones are burning (2nd ed. ed.). Lawrenceville, NJ: Red Sea Press, 
49. 
3
 Ranard, D. A. (2007). The Kunama. Cultural Orientation Resource Center Refugee Backgrounder, 3, 
October 15, 2007. www.culturalorientation.net, 1.  
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develop an understanding of the specific issues that refugees face when adjusting to 
American culture and the particular challenges faced by Kunama refugees as a whole.  
Attempting to further understand the individual needs of the Kunama in adjusting to life 
in the U.S. necessitates a complete examination of the history that caused them to become 
refugees.  By understanding the different contextual layers that impact Kunama both at 
home and abroad, the international community can play a significant role in alleviating 
the plight of this small and widely ignored ethnic group. 
 To augment my examination of the Kunama, I conducted interviews with two 
Kunama refugees who have been living in Boston since 2007.  The purpose of these case 
studies was to draw connections between an ethnic group’s cultural background and their 
reactions to the resettlement aid that they receive.  As two examples of the wider Kunama 
community and the specific cultural differences that they bring with them to resettlement 
in the U.S., the interviewees provide a human face to the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict and 
how it has affected a community of people worldwide.  By gaining a more in-depth 
background of the Kunama’s struggles and the adjustment difficulties they face in 
resettlement, policy implications for social service agencies can be inferred to enable 
them to better serve and accompany this unique group of people through their transition.            
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Chapter 1: Background 
The Plight of Refugees Worldwide 
 With an estimated 13.9 million refugees and asylum seekers in the world today4, 
the need for competent and compassionate institutional structures in place to care for 
displaced people is critical.  Genocide, civil war, famine, and other humanitarian crises 
that cause people to flee from their homes have created an extremely vulnerable and 
needy population of people all over the world.  The 1951 Geneva Convention that 
brought the international community together to solve the refugee crisis resulting from 
World War II proposed a definition for refugees that still holds true today.  Although the 
definition continues to be a vital reference for international law protecting refugees and 
organizing international bodies to hold each other accountable for the care of refugees, it 
falls short in the modern world of global interdependence in which we all bear the burden 
of caring for refugees whether or not they have physically entered our country.  The 
definition of a refugee leaves many people vulnerable by minimizing tragic personal 
circumstances, excluding internally displaced peoples (IDPs), and diminishing the need 
for international cooperation. 
   Despite its flaws, the Geneva Convention provides an important basis for the 
global community to draw upon when formulating the actions we all take to care for 
some of the most vulnerable people in the world.  By establishing a refugee as any person 
who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
                                                 
4
 U.S. Committee on Refugees and Immigrants. (2007). World refugee survey 2007. Retrieved 13 February 
2008, from http://www.refugees.org/article.aspx?id=1942, Table 1.  
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country of his nationality,”5 the international community remains inclusive and tolerant of 
the human dignity found in personal identity.  No matter what personal identifying aspect 
subjects a person to persecution, they are eligible for refugee status.  What actions may 
qualify as persecution, however, is more problematic.   
 Defining a person as a refugee enables them some hope of receiving physical 
safety from a host country, particularly in non-refoulement, potential consideration for 
resettlement, and ideally the freedom to move around freely and to earn a livelihood6.  
However, it is only when nations respect and adhere to international laws concerning 
refugees that these benefits can be reaped.  The United Nations (UN) consciously chose 
to use “persecution” in the definition “as the central characteristic of the refugee was 
made to fit a Western interpretation of asylum seekers”7.  The Geneva Convention 
defined refugees within a historical moment: the context of World War II that would later 
be applied to Cold War refugees fleeing Communist countries as part of a democratic 
political agenda.  Responding to refugees’ distinct needs must include a non-
discriminatory approach to caring for those who are persecuted that all countries can 
adhere to, despite differing political agendas. 
 This general focus on persecution that was most aptly applied during the Cold 
War era is also in danger of reducing the humanity of each person’s situation.  Not only 
can people be harassed and discriminated against because of race, religion, or any other 
personal identifying characteristic, but they can be targeted for murder, rape, and torture 
                                                 
5
 UNHCR. (1951). The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1. Retrieved 13 February 2008, from 
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf , 16.  
6
 U.S. Committee on Refugees and Immigrants (2007), Tables 4 and 5. 
7
 Loescher, G. (1993). Beyond charity: International cooperation and the global refugee crisis (1st ed.). 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 57. 
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for the same reasons.  Fear of the government or other people within a person’s home 
country can range from the fear of being denied social services to the fear of being 
murdered along with one’s family in a genocidal act.  Although tragic personal 
circumstances among people may differ, it is important to respect the fear that people feel 
as being “well-founded” no matter their circumstances.  Human beings do not willingly 
choose to leave the comfort and familiarity of their homes without a compelling reason to 
do so, whether it is an economic inability to earn a sufficient income or the threat of 
being killed.   
 The importance of formulating international laws to which all nations can adhere 
is that the laws “provide objective standards against which the actions of governments 
can be measured”8.  Different situations will always garner more awareness because of 
severity, and although it is important to respond to what the Western world may see as 
the most pressing of global crises, such as genocide, this focus should not reduce the 
value of upholding each person’s unique circumstances as significant and worthy of 
attention.  Despite this minimal basis and the UNHCR standard of global equity, nations 
are often inevitably guided by self-interest, leaving large groups of people unaccounted 
for and ignored on the world stage.              
 By leaving IDPs out of the refugee discussion, the Geneva Convention avoids the 
importance of responding to the human rights needs of people still within their national 
boundaries.  The definition includes that in addition to having a “well-founded fear of 
being persecuted,” a refugee must be “outside the country of his nationality”9.  Not only 
are millions of refugees stuck in protracted situations of long-term exile without any sign 
                                                 
8
 Haugen, G. (1999). Good news about injustice. Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 167. 
9
 UNHCR (1951), 16. 
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of a durable solution, but “the majority of new forcibly uprooted populations [remain] 
within their countries of origin”10.  These new trends in displacement require an expanded 
definition that will not leave IDPs without protection and vulnerable within their own 
countries.  Adequate care for people who have been victimized and in the process have 
been driven from their homes is just as vital for IDPs as it is for refugees, especially for 
those who are still susceptible to persecution within their borders and have been unable 
but willing to journey out of the line of attack.  Requiring victimized peoples to cross 
national boundaries places an unnecessary burden on those people at the height of their 
greatest need for humanitarian aid and physical protection.    
 The modern age of global interdependence requires all nations to get involved in 
caring for the world’s most vulnerable people.  In 1951 the UN upheld that the proper 
care for the needs of refugees cannot “be achieved without international co-operation”11 
because of the unequal burden mass migrations of refugees may cause for specific 
countries.  Michael Ignatieff argues that we are living in an age guided by a global 
conscience that transcends national boundaries, so it is necessary to play a role in 
ameliorating refugee crises regardless of location.  As early as the 1960s, because of 
television news, “we have been brought face-to-face with human misery that was once 
beyond our ken and therefore beyond the ambit of those emotions- guilt, shame, outrage, 
remorse- that lead us to make other people’s trouble our business”12.  Gary Haugen 
expands this call to care for others without discrimination as a religious act, in that “the 
                                                 
10
 UNHCR. (2006). The state of the World’s refugees 2006. United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, 1. Retrieved 14 February 2008, from 
http://www.unhcr.org/static/publ/sowr2006/toceng.htm  
11
 UNHCR (1951), 15. 
12
 Ignatieff, M. (1997). The warrior's honor: Ethnic war and the modern conscience. New York: Owl 
Books, 90.   
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extent to which our compassion extends beyond our immediate circle is the extent to 
which we are loving more like God and less like our carnal selves”13.  This necessity for 
global solidarity in dealing with humanitarian crises such as the care of refugees requires 
adequate guidelines to be followed for countries which do not physically receive asylum 
seekers across their borders but still must play a role in the global responsibility to attend 
to all who are needy.   
 Minimal international guidelines are a vital way to engage every country in acting 
on the global refugee crisis.  The 1951 Geneva definition, although providing a solid 
foundation for determining who qualifies as a refugee, leaves many other people 
vulnerable.  As a definition constructed within a particular historical context, national 
interests deciding what type of persecution is the most deplorable can lead to unequal 
care for different groups of refugees by ignoring their unique needs.  Failing to account 
for IDPs also leaves millions of people with less access to the humanitarian aid that they 
desperately need.  Although the definition goes on to provide ample guidance for a 
nation’s responsibility to protect refugees who cross over into their land, the ideal of 
international cooperation must include the involvement of all nations in caring for those 
who flee their homes, especially since a majority of refugees are now displaced in other 
third world countries who do not have adequate economic resources to provide for them.  
Caring for refugees is the concern of all, especially in an increasingly globalized and 
educated world that no longer allows us to cite ignorance as an excuse for inaction.  It is 
within this context that the U.S. now finds itself with refugees at its doorstep, including 
the Kunama.  The U.S. is just one nation in a world of interdependent nations that are 
                                                 
13
 Haugen, G. (1999), 83. 
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now in a place of responding to these people without a safe haven and caught between 
two nations.         
A History of Subjugation 
 Giving an overview of the history of the Kunama and their place within the wider 
conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia is necessary for understanding how they came to be 
a people group that has recently been subject to persecution.  I do not attempt to make 
claims about which nation is more justified than the other, who is to blame, or to provide 
answers for how their border should best be defined in the future.  I only attempt to 
provide a backdrop for where the Kunama people are coming from and the different 
cultural, political, social, ethnic, and historical spheres that play a role in shaping both 
their group identity and their individual identities.  Peoples are inextricably shaped by the 
different circumstances surrounding them, and in the case of the Kunama, they have been 
deeply influenced by the humanitarian and political crises in which they participated and 
in which they found themselves unwillingly caught up in.  The cultural traditions dictated 
by history also play a role in a group’s ability to adapt to a new environment, such as the 
U.S., that comes with a distinctively different cultural history.  I thus find it important to 
begin with the role of colonialism in the Horn of Africa and the subjugation under which 
the Kunama found themselves throughout Eritrea’s tempestuous journey to nationhood, 
and their uncomfortable position straddling the line between two countries.   
Colonialism in the Horn of Africa 
 The complexity of the relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea stems from the 
intertwined history of the two nations and their common identity forged under European 
colonialism and the oppressive Stalinist regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam from 1974 to 
 15 
199114.  The land that is now called modern Eritrea was contested by several different 
powers over the course of the 20th century, with Ethiopia never giving up its claim to the 
land despite its inability to maintain it effectively against European powers15.  Although 
foreign powers infringe on a nation and drastically disrupt a people’s natural progression, 
colonialism also provided a common enemy for Eritrea’s different ethnic groups to unite 
against, marking the beginning of a national Eritrean consciousness and the move 
towards future independence.  The Kunama, however, perhaps never felt comfortable 
with this national unity imposed by external powers.  It remains unclear whether they 
identify more as Eritreans or as Ethiopians, just one such case of ethnic tribes or 
pastoralist groups throughout Africa who continue to find citizenship in a nation-state 
unnecessary and colonially-imposed. 
 Italy’s entrance onto the world stage by joining other European superpowers in 
the drive to colonize Africa began towards the end of the 19th century with Eritrea.  
Territorial expansion to Eritrea began as early as 1882 when an Italian colonial 
administration was set up in Assab16.  In 1891 an Italian commission was sent across the 
Mediterranean Sea to evaluate the agricultural prospects of the region.  The region was 
seen as a beacon of hope during a period in which Italy was suffering from declining 
agrarian production.  Italy’s colonial objectives mirrored those of other European powers 
at that time, setting out in hopes of exploiting Eritrea’s natural resources for industrial 
and commercial purposes, establishing settler colonies to which Italian peasants could 
migrate to, and setting up a base from which to expand deeper into Africa with the help 
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 Henze, P. B. (2001). Eritrea’s war: Confrontation, international response, outcome, prospects (1st ed. 
ed.). Addis Ababa, Ethiopia: Shama Books, 6. 
15
 Henze, P. B. (2001), 231. 
16
 Killion, T. (1998). In Woronoff J. (Ed.), Historical dictionary of Eritrea. Lanham, MD & London: The 
Scarecrow Press, Inc., 269. 
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of colonial soldiers recruited from the native people.  The commission reported back to 
Italy, remarking on the fecundity of the arable land and the perceived “docility” of the 
Eritreans towards the Italians17.  Expansion and the encouragement of Italian settlers thus 
continued in full force, along with the formulation of the boundaries that now make up 
modern-day Eritrea. 
 Although Muslim Eritreans who occupied the lowlands generally welcomed the 
Italians as protection against the imperial government of Yohannes IV, many other 
Eritreans, particularly the Tigrinya majority, distrusted Italian rule as a threat to their 
regional hegemony.  This distrust first manifested itself in a January 1887 attack on an 
Italian fort orchestrated by Yohannes himself.  The attack had the opposite of the desired 
effect, leading to Italy declaring war on the area and dispatching 20,000 troops to Eritrea.  
By forming an alliance with the Ethiopian government, Italy secured a Treaty in 1889 
that recognized Ethiopia’s possession of a significant part of Eastern Eritrea.  With the 
Treaty of Wichale, Italy secured its colonial holdings and officially created the “Colony 
of Eritrea” on January 1, 189018.  This “Red Sea Colony” was now its own political 
entity, yet it continued to be viewed by Italians as merely a base for their future colonial 
aspirations of capturing Ethiopia and forming an empire19.   Expansion persisted, and in 
the early part of the 1890’s over 400,000 hectares of land was sectioned off by the 
colonial administration to be distributed among Italian immigrants who settled in the 
colony20.  Discontent with the Italian administration grew among native Eritreans as their 
land was taken away and redistributed. 
                                                 
17
 Yohannes, O. (1991). Eritrea, a pawn in world politics. Gainesville, FL: University of Florida Press, 8. 
18
 Killion, T. (1998), 270. 
19
 Henze, P. B. (2001), 233. 
20
 Yohannes, O. (1991), 9. 
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 A historical event that often marks the beginning of Eritrean unity and a growing 
call to nationalism was sparked by Italy’s land confiscation plan.  Under the leadership of 
Bahta Hagos, a 2,000 man army of Eritreans arrested the Italian Secretary at Sageneiti 
along with two telegraph workers on December 14, 189421.  Hagos himself had formerly 
been employed by the Italians as a chief respected for his Catholicism and loyalty, but 
was pushed towards rebellion because of the Italian’s policy of confiscating land, 
womanizing, arresting other leaders, and failing to uphold the democratic institutions that 
characterized the Akele Guzai region22.  Within five short days, the revolt was crushed 
and Hagos was killed23.  Despite the uprising’s marked failure, it is remembered as the 
first and most important rebellion against the Italians.  Hagos “today symbolizes the 
tradition of resistance to outside occupation that has united Eritreans from the highlands 
and lowlands”24.  Eritrea was unable to cause significant damage to their colonial rulers, 
however, until fifteen months later when Italy attempted to invade neighboring Ethiopia.  
Severely underestimating the military might of the Ethiopians, Italy was defeated within 
hours, as many Eritreans in the Italian army absconded to join their African 
counterparts25.  Italy settled back into a period of empire-building without military force, 
focusing on the development of Eritrea as a foundation for engaging in commerce with 
Northern Ethiopia, continuing to recruit colonial soldiers, and building an infrastructure 
that united the region with railroads, roads, and more defined urban centers. 
 Italian economic policy was revised in 1926 to enable farmers who had settled in 
Eritrea to create capitalistic, commercial farms by providing them with tax incentives and 
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 Yohannes, O. (1991), 9. 
22
 Killion, T. (1998), 107. 
23
 Yohannes, O. (1991), 9. 
24
 Killion, T. (1998), 106. 
25
 Henze, P. B. (2001), 234-235. 
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the free importing of Italian farming equipment.  This privatization of Eritrean land was 
only made possible by peasants being forced off their land and pushed into the urban 
centers to look for work.  A growing mass of landless peasants thus came into contact 
with one another: 
The political significance of this economic process was that the affected peasants 
from all nationalities, for the first time, began to work together and were subjected to 
the same kinds of exploitation, oppression, and discrimination in big plantations 
owned by foreign entrepreneurs.  Under such conditions, it was inevitable that the 
rural proletariat would develop some sense of solidarity within itself which, over 
time, would translate into national awakening and political activism26. 
 
Since its inception, colonialism had marked the way for Eritrean unity and unrest simply 
by providing a space for different ethnic groups to come into contact with one another 
and formulate a single identity. 
World War II and British Administration 
 Various ethnic groups also confronted each other in the military, with thousands 
of Eritreans conscripted for colonial expansion into Ethiopia27.  Eritreans participated in 
the colonial structure predominantly as soldiers, which only increased in the 1930’s when 
Benito Mussolini’s fascist regime took over.  Seeking revenge for Italy’s embarrassing 
defeat at the hands of Ethiopia in 1896, Mussolini declared that widespread preparations 
be made for Ethiopia’s conquest28.  These plans were never realized, however, as Britain 
seized Eritrea from the Italians in 1941 as part of Italy’s eventual defeat in World War II.  
Eritrea was thus passed between colonial hands, and succumbed to a British Military 
Administration that would last until 1952.  The temporary administration was designed to 
last only until the Four Powers in World War II: Britain, the United States, France, and 
the Soviet Union, could determine the colony’s fate.  Unable to reach a consensus, the 
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 Yohannes, O. (1991), 11. 
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 Ibid, 11. 
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 Killion, T. (1998), 272. 
 19 
“problem” of Eritrea was passed on once again into the international hands of the UN in 
195229.  The continual debate over Eritrea’s destiny that seemed to involve every country 
but Eritrea itself only added to the small region’s growing nationalist sentiment and 
desire for self-determination. 
The Ethiopian Federation  
 To answer the question of what was going to happen to Italy’s former Red Sea 
colony, the UN passed a resolution in 1952 to federate Eritrea under the rule of 
Ethiopia30.  The recommendation that “Eritrea shall constitute an autonomous unit 
federated with Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian Crown”31 was far from 
giving Eritrea any personal freedoms.  Although the region had grown in distinction from 
the giant to the South during Italian and British occupation, the former ties between the 
two areas were seen as valid grounds for establishing one united entity.  Many Eritreans 
other than the Kunama did not welcome the prospect of once again being denied their 
right to self-rule and subjugated under a more powerful nation, whether or not that nation 
was African rather than European.   
 Unity with Ethiopia catered directly to the wishes of Haile Selassie’s government, 
which wanted Ethiopia’s ancient link to the Red Sea restored for economic purposes32.  
As mentioned previously, not all Eritreans were against Ethiopian rule, included the more 
politically ambivalent Kunama.  Eritreans divided along ideological lines into two 
parties: the Unionists who advocated for Ethiopian nationalism, and the anti-Unionists 
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who supported the idea of an independent Eritrean state and eventually formed the basis 
for future liberation fronts.  Unionists painted a picture of Eritrea as a natural extension of 
the long and admirable Ethiopian empire, gaining most of its proponents from Christians 
who saw themselves as a part of Ethiopia’s religious legacy33.  Muslims from the 
lowlands, in contrast, felt little brotherhood with their Ethiopian neighbors and thus were 
more inclined to join the anti-Unionist party34.  The party consistently drew upon 
Eritrea’s uniqueness as well as memories of devastation brought upon the Eritrean 
lowlands at the hands of past Ethiopian Christian nobility35.  Ethnic divides that 
somewhat mirrored political, regional, and religious divides set the framework for greater 
tension within Eritrea under Ethiopian hegemony. 
 In the 1950’s, however, Ethiopian control became less appealing as the realities of 
the federation were carried about.  Haile Selassie’s government, perhaps embarrassed by 
the trouble that Eritrea had caused in the past, gradually appropriated powers away from 
the region to bring them further under Ethiopian domination.  This process included the 
banning of trade unions in 1953, Presidential replacement in 1955, suspending the 
parliament in 1956, and in 1959 removing the Eritrean flag altogether and replacing it 
with an Ethiopian one36.  In March of 1955 Selassie stated that “there are no internal or 
external affairs as far as the office of His Imperial Majesty’s representative is concerned, 
and there shall be none in the future.  The affairs of Eritrea concern Ethiopia as a whole 
and the Emperor”37.  The federation, as had been defined by the UN, failed to last and 
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was instead replaced by a widening Ethiopian empire at the expense of Eritrean self-
determination.  The dismantlement of the federation was complete when in 1962 Eritrea 
officially became Ethiopia’s fourteenth province rather than a distinct entity under the 
Ethiopian umbrella38.  In the name of unity, Ethiopia had effectively provoked rising 
discontent within its newest province, giving rise to subsequent rebel movements. 
The Birth of Eritrean Liberation Movements 
 For the next long thirty years, the Eritrean nationalist dream manifested itself in 
armed struggle, both against Ethiopia and within the region itself among groups with 
varying political sentiments.  What is now called Africa’s longest war can be attributed to 
the ineffectiveness of international involvement, including the UN’s failure to take 
responsibility for its role in passing the Eritrean state over to Ethiopia as well as the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU)’s continual denial of the legitimacy of Eritrea’s 
demands for freedom39.  Since it was founded in 1963, the OAU has been extremely 
dubious of further partitioning Africa, not wanting to disrupt the boundaries, however 
delicate they may be, imposed upon the continent by European superpowers40.  
Abandoning all hope that the UN would enforce their 1950 resolution and seek 
retribution against Ethiopia, Eritreans felt that taking up arms was their only option41.  
Without outside aid and fighting against the overwhelming international support of 
Ethiopia in the beginning, Eritreans embarked on a lengthy war that would cost them 
thousands of lives. 
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Eritrea proves to be an example of a long legacy of creating refugees, with exiled 
people in the Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt, and throughout the Middle East as early as the 
1950’s.  It was from these factions outside the region that the liberation movements were 
born and political ambitions were organized for Eritrea.  Some of these refugees had fled 
the land because of Emperor Selassie’s abuse of power in attacking the Eritrean lowlands 
with repeated military fronts, so they were eager to fight for their country’s freedom even 
from abroad42.  It was in September of 1961 that Muslim forces from the West sparred 
with the Ethiopian troops, beginning the thirty year war.  Although the battle was brief 
and drew little attention, it pinpointed the birth of the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)43.   
The ELF was founded abroad in Cairo, Egypt by Muslim exiles which had fled 
Eritrea44.  The ELF was frustrated with the slow pace of the already existent Eritrean 
Liberation Movement (ELM), founded by other Eritrean exiles in the Sudan, which had 
been propagating a secular movement to unite Eritrea on the basis of a nationally united 
democratic government45.  The ELF took over as the main organizational front for 
Eritrean self-determination amid the birth of multiple political factions fighting for the 
same nationalism with different agendas.  Although the ELF was first composed 
primarily of nomadic Muslims, the movement spread and eventually included the 
Christian peasantry in its ranks46.  The notion of armed struggle against what was viewed 
as a colonial Ethiopian force was popular, but the ELF was doomed to failure because of 
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its disorganization and the divisiveness that was implied in the movement’s use of tribal, 
regional, and religious ties in its recruitment process.   
No group was more affected by the ELF’s exclusionism than the Kunama, who 
maintained animosity towards the Bani Amir and Nara peoples, the majority of ELF 
fighters, both of which had raided the Kunama’s cattle throughout their history.  Bani 
Amir ELF leader Idris Muhammad Awate had a particularly hostile reputation with the 
Kunama.  Retaining memories of being targeted in raids, the Kunama not only avoided 
involvement in the ELF but sought ways to counteract the rebellion47.  Due to this 
divisiveness, leadership within the ELF recognized the need for reform as well, as it 
lacked an organized program to reach the masses rather than just recruiting private armies 
with religious and tribal appeals.   
The ELF ended up splitting into three main factions, and in September of 1973, 
members of two of those factions decided to merge under the new name of the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF)48.  Despite the ELF’s attempt to liquidate the EPLF and 
a brief civil war that lasted until 1974, it was clear that popular support was behind the 
EPLF as even ELF fighters began to oppose the civil war that was counterproductive to 
the more important goal: Eritrean independence49.  According to EPLF Central 
Committee member Amdemicael Kahsai, the main difference between the two groups 
was the type of independent Eritrea they were fighting for: “will it be an independent 
Eritrean state that will safeguard the interests of the mass of the peasants and workers, or 
will it be a state serving the interests of a minority, more or less similar to the present 
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regime of exploitation?”50  By sticking to democratic ideals that attempted to include all 
Eritreans, the EPLF surpassed the ELF in its ability to mobilize and politicize the masses.  
The EPLF, however, in light of its initial success, could never have foreseen the length of 
the independence battle that lay ahead of them.   
The Derg 
 Eritrean guerilla movements led by the EPLF became even more difficult and 
costly under the military junta regime that came into power in Ethiopia in 1974.  
Mengistu’s reign came to be known as the Derg, Amharic for “committee,” and was 
known for its brutality and use of torture against political opposition51.  Up until 
Mengistu’s regime, the EPLF had been largely successful in gaining control of Eritrean 
land and driving out Ethiopian forces.  Within the same year that Mengistu was 
tightening his reign, the EPLF had liberated the towns of Afabet, Nakfa, Decamere, 
Segeneitti, and Keren, the second largest city after the capital Asmara.  Rather than 
planning for over a decade of continued fighting, the EPLF felt that they were on the 
brink of success with nearly 98% of Eritrean territory liberated.  In 1977, Kahsai stated 
that “with the liberation of Keren, we consider the war in Eritrea to be practically 
finished”52.  Just a year later, however, Ethiopia would be making the opposite claim with 
the recapture of Keren and “the end of the 17-year-old separatist dream”53. International 
involvement was the force that turned the tide against Eritrean independence, as the 
support of the Soviet Union supplied Mengistu with the weaponry, advice, and air 
support to launch a mass offensive and to take back control of major Eritrean cities by the 
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summer of 197854.  Perseverance would become the rallying cry of the EPLF, as 
continued Soviet support of Ethiopia reduced nearly all of the hope that still remained 
that Eritreans would reclaim their right to self-determination. 
 In an attempt to assert the fulfillment of his victory, Mengistu moved the 
Ethiopian government to Eritrea’s capital, Asmara, in 1982.  The move only lasted for 
two and half months, as the victory over the Eritrean insurgency was not as finalized as 
Mengistu would have liked55.  The holistic Red Star campaign that Mengistu launched on 
military, ideological, political, organizational, cultural, and economic fronts was designed 
“to end for once and for all the organized banditry”56.  The Marxist-Leninist government 
structure in 1984 formed the Worker’s Party of Ethiopia (WPE) and required that most 
Eritrean civil servants and management level employees affiliate themselves with it.  
Political opponents were in danger of execution, a reign of terror that culminated in an 
attempted coup against Mengistu in 1989 in both Addis Ababa and Asmara.  Although 
the coup was immediately defeated in Addis Ababa, it lasted for three days in Asmara 
until Mengistu’s slogan “Unity or Death” overpowered the temporary government with 
the execution of 30 senior officers and the arrest of 250 more57.  Although the Soviet-
inspired Communist revolution proved forceful, the EPLF dream of Eritrean liberation 
continued to persist, and was not far from being realized.     
United States Involvement 
 A 1972 report from the Middle East Research and Information Project stated that 
“There is a national liberation struggle raging in northeast Africa, and most Americans 
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don’t know it yet, but, just as in Vietnam, the United States is heavily involved on the 
side of repression”58.  Over the years, U.S. policy towards Eritrea has taken on various 
contradictions as it has evolved according to U.S. political agendas.  The U.S. consulate 
in Asmara was established back in 1942, just as Britain was establishing control over the 
former Italian colony.  As part of a 1953 defense treaty signed with Ethiopia, the U.S. 
government established an important military base at Kagnew that stationed as many as 
4,000 U.S. military personnel in the 1960s59.  Kagnew, home to a satellite tracking 
system, was a strategic base for the global American intelligence system as the U.S. 
continued to support the Ethiopian federation along with 153 million dollars in military 
assistance during its first two decades of rule60.  The U.S. had been integral in the original 
UN decision to join Eritrea with Ethiopia, so it continued to support Selassie’s regime as 
a leader who in theory represented hope for an independent Africa that was against 
fascism, colonialism, and racism61.  From the Eritrean perspective, however, a fully 
independent Africa would include an independent Eritrean state, so U.S. military 
occupation remained an unwelcome obstacle to their dreams. 
 The irony of the mutually beneficial relationship between Ethiopia and the U.S. 
was that U.S. placement in Kagnew actually meant that “Eritrea provided Ethiopia the 
military resources it needed for the containment and suppression of Eritrean 
nationalism”62.  U.S. self-interest in Eritrea also translated into the economic realm, as 
Eritrean development took hold in the exploitation of its natural resources.  In the 
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petroleum sector, the Ethiopian government leased the oil rights to coastal Eritrea to 
Standard Oil of New Jersey and Mobil in 196363.  Eritreans benefited from other U.S. 
development projects, however, with World Bank funds invested into the Asmara 
economy for aid projects such as schools, libraries, and the first Peace Corps volunteers 
in Eritrea who arrived in 196264.   
U.S. tendencies against Eritrean independence would shift with the regime shift 
from Selassie to Mengistu, as a heavily anti-Communist policy became wrapped up in an 
Eritrean insurgency that joined with some of their Ethiopian neighbors against 
Mengistu’s brutality.  In May 1991 Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe, and the EPLF released 
Ethiopian prisoners, including officers and WPE members at the border.  Eritrean WPE 
members were brought to justice according to their crimes, with most being relegated to 
attend “re-education” courses about the value of national independence, assigned to 
national service tasks, and those accused of killing other Eritreans were tried and 
imprisoned65.  The collapse of the Derg in 1991 and the end of armed struggle between 
what would soon become two countries left little in question about the direction in which 
the country was heading.          
Eritrean Independence         
 Italy’s first-born colony and Africa’s longest war became the first successful 
secession on the continent in post-colonial times.  In his Independence Day speech in 
1993, President Isaias Afewerki remarked, “Let us rejoice that our dream and aspirations 
of attaining national sovereignty and dignity have been realized”66.  Ethiopia could no 
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longer hold on to hopes of maintaining the economic benefits of easy access to the Red 
Sea, but Eritrean nationalism actually benefited the Ethiopians, because by “insisting on 
independence, the EPLF relieved post-Mengistu Ethiopia of the costs of reconstruction 
and took them all upon itself”67.  In April of 1993 an EPLF referendum gave Eritrean 
people two possible votes: to be for or against independence.  Of the 1.2 million 
registered voters, 99.8% of them voted in favor of independence68.  On May 24, 1993, 
Eritrea was officially and decisively declared to be Africa’s 52nd nation-state with nearly 
nonexistent opposition69.  The dream that independence would forever end the fighting 
with Ethiopia, however, was short lived as the attempt to construct boundaries between 
the two nations was not nearly as clear-cut as the fact of Eritrea’s nationhood.  The 1990s 
began as a hopeful decade full of promise for the new nation, but would end with more 
confusion and the unnecessary use of military force (see map, Appendix 1).           
The Place of the Kunama 
The Eritrean independence that finally brought together a wide variety of 
ethnicities, religions, regions, and occupations traced its roots back through its oppressed 
history. Urban centers during Italian colonialism marked the beginning of interethnic 
relations in Eritrea as meeting grounds for the nine different ethnic groups.  Each of these 
groups speaks their own language, although 80% of Eritreans speak either Tigrinya, the 
most widely used, or Tigré.  The other nationalities include Afar, Baria, Bilein, Hedareb, 
Kunama, Rashaida, and Saho (see Appendix 2).  In addition to having their own 
languages, all have uniquely defined regional areas, and are at different levels of socio-
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economic development70.  Trying to place Eritreans into distinct categories, however, is 
rather difficult.  Each ethnic group is heterogeneous within itself, possessing internal 
cultural, religious, and economic divides71.  Eritrea is thus an example of a nation unified 
by external forces, brought together by joint discontent under colonialism and Ethiopian 
power.  Finding common ground among such a diverse population is an ongoing struggle. 
Descended from the Nilo-Saharan people who perhaps occupied western Eritrea 
in ancient times, the Kunama occupy the Barka administrative region between the Gash 
and Setit rivers.  The Kunama are the only ethnic group that occupies a region south of 
the Magreb River, a natural boundary used to split Eritrea from Ethiopia.  Here the 
majority of the Kunama practice raising livestock and agriculture72 (see village photo in 
Appendix 3).  Although a cohesive group with their own language that is also called 
Kunama, they include a variety of religious orientations, including a few Christians and a 
majority of Muslims and traditional Animists73.  Many maintain an ancient religion 
centered on a female creator God, Anna, and a variety of local spirits, shaman healers, 
and rain makers.  Subscribing to a religion that upholds the divine feminine perhaps plays 
a role in the Kunama being a traditionally gender egalitarian society, lending support to 
the group’s uniqueness.  In fact, “the Kunama are distinctive in Eritrea because of their 
egalitarian village councils and the high social status and property rights of women, 
which the present government upholds as a model for other Eritreans to follow.  On the 
other hand, the Kunama have suffered a long history of prejudice and enslavement at the 
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hands of their Muslim and Christian neighbors”74.  Partially because of their culture, the 
Kunama have had difficulty finding a national home in either Eritrea or Ethiopia. 
Since the 16th century, there are records of slave raids against the Kunama at the 
hands of their Eritrean neighbors75.  The language employed by other Eritreans in 
referring to this minority ethnic group has only encouraged this history.  Although the 
word Kunama means “those who I call people,” their neighbors have commonly referred 
to them as Baza76.  “Baza” is an Arabic and Tigrinya name with a derogatory connotation 
similar to “slave” that refers to the ancient history of the Kunama being enslaved to the 
Arabs and the highlanders77.  There has been longstanding tension, particularly between 
the neighboring Bani Amir and Nara people, which led many Kunama to actually 
welcome Italian colonialists as protectors against village raids.  When many Bani Amir 
and Nara peoples got involved with the independence movements against Ethiopia, some 
Kunama were more prone to side against their ancient enemies and to join Ethiopia’s 
side.  Not only were the Kunama meagerly involved with the Eritrean independence 
movement, but many forged close bonds with the Ethiopian government and became 
recruits to fight against independence78.  For years Kunama sympathy was closely 
intertwined with the Ethiopian government and Unionist ideology, signaling a future of 
national identity confusion and a failure to be accepted by either country as their own.   
The Border Conflict, 1998-2001 
The Kunama, formerly a largely ignored minority group, became a central point 
of conflict between the two nations when a crisis surfaced over the unresolved border 
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between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998.  Former brothers in the defeat of the Mengistu 
regime earlier that decade, the border war seemed confusing and unnecessary to the 
international community who had been trying to stop the buildup of troops on either side 
for months.  Although Eritreans would disagree, the war initially happened because 
Eritrea, unprovoked, invaded territory being administered by Ethiopia79.  Each side 
amassed thousands of troops around the disputed territory: a 250-square-mile zone 
around the town of Badme called the Yigra triangle.  Despite the disputed border debate 
that has been going on since Eritrea’s independence, the two nations had remained allies 
until the border conflict erupted.  The New York Times reported that “Details of what 
occurred are sketchy. Ethiopia says Eritrean troops crossed into its territory, ransacked 
health centers and schools and kidnapped civil servants. Ethiopian officials maintain that 
the troops are still inside their territory”80.  Conflict over a triangle of land emerged as a 
conflict over a people group, as the Kunama were suddenly confronted by warring 
nations on their turf.  Straddling a border as a shared people between two nations, a 
unique Kunama identity would form as thousands fled the battlefield amid the confusion 
of which nationality they more closely identified with. 
Perhaps the most confusing aspect of the border dispute is that the disputed 
territory has little to make it desirable.  The town of Badme is “a place of no particular 
consequence in the highlands…none of the Badme region has much value or historical or 
emotional resonance.  It is merely undefined”81.  Yet, somehow this area sparked a bitter 
battle that would cost thousands of lives on both sides.  Despite the poverty of each 
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nation, spending in the border conflict amounted to nearly a billion dollars for each side.  
Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Isaias Afewerki, both 
former guerilla leaders who actually fought together, were seen as beacons of hope for 
peace in the Horn of Africa and as leaders who would grow into their roles as reformers, 
both having the support and friendship of the Clinton administration in the U.S.82  
International disappointment abounded at the eruption and the continuance of violence 
between the two nations.  Eritrea declared that they were simply reclaiming their rightful 
territory, while Ethiopia labeled their affront an invasion.   
Attempts to end the battle would prove difficult.  Despite their limited resources 
and disadvantage in numbers, Eritrea stubbornly continued to hold out hope for 
establishing what Afewerki viewed as their original territory created during colonialism 
and proved that the perseverance their guerilla fighters had learned over decades of 
fighting for independence had not yet run out.  In June of 2000 the New York Times 
reported: “Ethiopia and Eritrea were engaged in heavy fighting all along their border 
today, just hours after Eritrea said that it had accepted a comprehensive peace plan that 
included a cease-fire”83.  Afewerki seemed unwilling to admit that his invasion had been 
a gross miscalculation, not anticipating the firm counterattack on Ethiopia’s part, so the 
Eritrean army was pushed to continue against all odds.    
In addition to the inordinate loss of life and economic resources that continued 
along with the armed struggle, one of the tragedies of the invasion was the breakdown of 
brotherhood that had seemed to exist between the two nations since Eritrean 
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independence.  Ethiopian bitterness over Eritrea’s attack led the government to expel 
thousands of Eritreans, some of which had been living in Ethiopia their whole lives.  
What had appeared to be a salvaged inter-country relationship was once again broken. 
Economic relations were cut off as Ethiopian exports turned to the ports of Djibouti for 
help84.  With international pressure bearing down on Eritrea, however, the crisis would 
not be allowed to continue for too much longer.  In December of 2000 Kofi Annan, then 
the Secretary-General of the UN, announced that the war was over along with a peace 
treaty signed in Algeria.  The treaty set in motion discussion about the disputed 620-mile 
border region, as well as initiated the release of prisoners and detained civilians85.  With 
two years of fighting and around 100,000 deaths at a close, 2001 proved that the two 
nations were finally committed to upholding the cease-fire.  Even though the border had 
not yet been finalized, a committed peace replaced fighting.  Birhane Ghebremichael, a 
58-year old Eritrean farmer, allowed himself to renew hopes of returning to his home: 
“‘Both we and the Ethiopians have had enough of war,’ he said.  'It looks like this is 
finally going to be settled’”86.  With weapons put away and silence reigning over the 
battlefield, national conflict would take on a more social nature as Eritreans remembered 
the dissent of the Kunama. 
 Throughout the border conflict, the Kunama acted as a critical voice within their 
country, voicing concerns against President Afewerki and the EPLF’s motives for 
crossing into Ethiopian territory.  Particularly from outside Eritrea, “anti-EPLF exiles 
have become vocal in Europe and America and at least two groups in Eritrea, Kunamas 
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and Afars, have announced opposition to the EPLF”.  With an almost prophetic voice in 
2000, Paul Henze comments that “Severe measures will no doubt be taken to contain 
them”87.  Severe measures were indeed taken as ethnic rivalries erupted against the 
Kunama and Afewerki proved that political opposition would not be tolerated while 
Eritrea fought to establish itself on the world stage.  Victimized by former ties with 
Ethiopia in the wake of resentment between the two nations, the Kunama struggled to 
find a home and thousands fled across the border to escape political persecution. 
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Chapter 2: Kunama in Exile 
Thousands of Kunama began crossing the border out of Eritrea from the 
beginning of the war in 1998 to the height of the border conflict in 2000.  Some fled to 
avoid conscription into the army for a political cause they disagreed with, while others 
felt persecuted from a long history of being suspected of harboring pro-Ethiopian 
sentiments and continuing to inhabit Ethiopian occupied territory.  As the war ended, 
even more Kunama left Eritrea because they feared governmental repercussions for their 
alleged disloyalty88.  The irony is in their being welcomed into supposedly enemy 
territory, but the Kunama have never fit in well with their national counterparts.  Multiple 
refugee camps have been established in Ethiopia since the beginning of the 21st century 
to account for this group, as well as other war victims and army deserters.  What began as 
a tiny ethnic group estimated to be between 60,000 to 100,000 people in Eritrea has now 
spread out to inhabit areas all across the globe, from nearby Sudan, Ethiopia, and Egypt 
to the United States, Canada, and Europe.  Today, the Kunama are almost more aptly 
described as global citizens than as Eritreans or Ethiopians.  
Motivation to Flee 
 The Geneva Convention sets a precedent of trust for those people fleeing 
persecution and crossing an international boundary, because there must be a legitimate 
reason to leave before people are willing to forsake their homeland along with all that is 
familiar.  Although many people leave simply with hopes for a better future as economic 
migrants, human beings in general “move about a great deal, but not because they love to 
move.  They are, most of them, inclined to stay where they are unless their life is very 
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difficult there”89.  Eritreans were driven from their homes, and in most cases away from 
their families, because the life they were being forced to live or the prospect of what their 
life would be like in the future was bleak. 
 In addition to the violence of the border war, the political climate and 
governmental persecution led many people to fear for their lives, privacy, and personal 
freedom.  Abolishing freedom of the press, in September 2001 the Eritrean government 
shut down all private newspapers and imprisoned a significant number of journalists.  
Reporters without Borders, a Paris-based organization, has labeled Eritrea “Africa’s 
largest prison for journalists” and among the five worst countries in the world for 
repression of the media90.  Political suppression also turned to Kunama, as those who 
were suspected to be traitors siding with Ethiopia during the border conflict.  One 
Kunama woman, Izabella Aron, who was eventually resettled to the United States, tells 
her story: “Back in 1991 when Eritrea was ‘liberated,’ the new government harassed me 
and imprisoned me for seven months for the simple reasons that I have a minority ethnic 
background and that I was married to a former Ethiopian soldier”91.  In the wake of 
establishing Eritrea’s independence in 1993 and abolishing all political parties except for 
the EPLF, Eritrean nationals who were viewed as a threat to a homogenous political 
climate were in danger of imprisonment, fines, or persecution.  Today, Isaias Afewerki’s 
administration maintains its hegemony over the political direction of the country, and is 
quick to discourage any signs of opposition. 
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 Perhaps the most common reason for Eritreans becoming refugees and taking 
refuge in Ethiopia, however, was forced military conscription, especially for those who 
disagreed with the necessity of fighting Ethiopia over what could be seen as a trivial 
border argument.  In 2000, Berhane Marco, a refugee formerly working with a USAID 
project in Eritrea, said: “we are fleeing extortion and forced recruitment by the Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) army, and hope to be able to till our lands one day 
without outside intervention”92.  All Eritrean men are forced to serve in the army, 
including university students who simply want to learn and dream of building a career 
and exchanging intellectual ideas rather than putting themselves in danger of cutting their 
lives short.  Most unsettling is the punishment inflicted upon family members who 
remain in Eritrea if their son decides to flee rather than join the army.  In 2007, an ex-
soldier said that he heard his family back in Eritrea was fined 50,000 nakfa (about 
$3,300) because he had fled, a story that was corroborated by others in the refugee camps 
whose families experienced the same thing93.  Although other countries in the world, such 
as Singapore and North Korea, obligate service in the armed forces for a set number of 
years, the volatile ongoing border dispute with Ethiopia leaves those Eritreans who 
disagree with the purpose of the war without options for political expression.   
The government maintains that each man is assigned to 18 months of military 
service, but many refugees claimed that the national military was not adhering to their 
rules and were taking people from their homes and students from their schools without 
warning and forcing them to fight.  The Eritrean government denies these claims, saying 
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that there had been no second call-up94.  Eritrean authorities even went so far as to claim 
that the Kunama refugees had fled against their will, and should be viewed as abductees 
by the Ethiopian army.  A government official in 2002 stated that “people don’t go 
voluntarily with an invading army.  And if they did go voluntarily, in the midst of war, 
then they are not refugees.  They must be sent home”95.  The story coming from the 
refugees themselves, however, whether citing forced military service or ethnic 
persecution, point back to a seemingly endemic problem with the Eritrean political 
climate and the human dignity and prosperity that is taken away along with a lack of 
freedom.  Conditions in refugee camps, although hopefully providing safety from 
continued persecution, are still lacking in providing basic activities for human dignity 
that would enable their occupants to prosper.  Eritrean refugees, both Kunama and other 
ethnic groups dodging forced military service, have waited years for the politics of their 
home country to change and in many cases are still waiting for a durable solution.    
Wa'ala Nihibi Camp  
 The Kunama are a refugee group that clearly fails under the definition provided 
by the 1951 Geneva Convention, but the international support afforded to them in 
response to their persecution as an ethnic group is not sufficient in providing many of 
them with opportunities for the future.  The camps in Ethiopia, including Wa’ala Nihibi, 
have been far from temporary as eight years after the war’s end the Kunama still have 
little hope of returning to their Eritrean homeland without severe social and governmental 
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maltreatment.  The search for durable solutions has been critical in resettling the Kunama 
and in finding permanent homes for them outside of Eritrea.      
Near the town of Shiraro in a remote area of Ethiopia, the Wa’ala Nihibi camp 
was set up to accommodate some 4,000 of the Kunama who fled in 2000 at the height of 
the war96.  A November 2002 report states that like all refugee camps “Wa’ala Nihibi is 
supposed to be a temporary camp, until a suitable site is identified further away from the 
border”.  The UNHCR began running into problems in 2002 because the Kunama in the 
camp were being joined by Eritreans of other ethnic groups who were fleeing forced 
military recruitment as well.  The blanket refugee status UNHCR had been giving to 
Eritreans crossing into the camp across a 25 kilometer buffer zone that separates the two 
countries had to be reevaluated, as the camp struggled to accommodate the new influx of 
refugees.  UNHCR said the blanket refugee status would end in December 2002.  One of 
the primary problems that arise in refugee camps such as Wa’ala Nihibi is the simple lack 
of anything to do97.  Without viable economic activities and a constant dependence on 
foreign aid for basic needs, refugees are left with little purpose and are often in danger of 
joining rebel groups.   
 The close proximity of the camp to the border immediately raised questions about 
the safety of its occupants.  Just 20 kilometers away, Wa’ala Nihibi falls into hotly 
contested area: the Yirga triangle near the town of Badme98.  After walking for several 
days, Eritrean refugees set up camp at Wa’ala Nihibi using scavenged wood and plastic 
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tarps provided by relief officials in Ethiopia.  Humanitarian assistance was critical as 
soon as the camp was set up, as in 2000 the UN World Food Program noticed a severe 
lack in adequate drinking water and signs of malnutrition in the children99.  In addition to 
health concerns, because of the camp’s nearness to Eritrea the refugees were constantly in 
fear of being attacked by the Eritrean army because many of them were deserters100.  The 
camp has also faced problems with multiple fires, such as a blaze started by flames from 
open fires in 2003 that destroyed a third of the shelters, many made out of straw.  After 
three years, it became obvious that a safer camp site with better resources was necessary 
and the UN’s Emergencies Unit for Ethiopia (EUE) increased the pressure for 
relocation101.  With limited hopes for repatriation, resettlement in a third country, or 
greater integration into Ethiopian society, the international community pushed to 
establish a more stable camp site farther from the border. 
Shimelba Camp 
 By 2003 when it was time to move to a new site farther from the border, Wa’ala 
Nihibi was home to some 4,000 ethnic Kunama refugees and around 1,000 other 
Eritreans.  Many ex-soldiers from the Eritrean armed forces were still dressed in combat 
clothes because they were the only ones they had, so along with the camp relocation the 
refugees were given new clothing102.  At this point the involvement of the international 
community stepped up, realizing that repatriation was not a forthcoming, plausible 
solution and that the Eritreans would need heightened humanitarian aid until a better 
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solution was found.  In September of 2003 the German government pledged a significant 
amount of money to help move the refugees through the UNHCR.  The new camp would 
also need improved facilities like easy access, water, and shelter103.  The new site was 
pinpointed at Shimelba, about 60 kilometers south of Wa’ala Nihibi by road, but again a 
lack of funding and resources put off the move until the following year104.   
Shimelba is located in a semi-arid, rocky landscape with scattered trees and 
shrubs. In 2004, refugees were still arriving in Ethiopia from Eritrea at a rate of about 250 
per month, and these would also be directed to Shimelba.  Some $800,000 would be spent 
by the UNHCR to build the camp, equipping it with the necessary water supplies, 
shelters, health centers, and schools.  This site, unlike the former, was constructed to 
meet international standards and UNHCR protection rules105.  Unfortunately, malnutrition 
remained a critical concern for Eritrean refugees.  A 2005 Humanitarian Report on 
Ethiopia noted critical malnutrition in Shimelba, with the highest rates among the 
Kunama.  The differences were puzzling and led researchers to undergo an analysis of the 
socioeconomic and cultural practices that may account for these rates, as refugees were 
technically receiving 2,100 calories a day per person106.  By April 2007, the Kunama were 
only 30% of Shimelba’s population, and the camp grew to accommodate some 14,300 
Eritreans continuing to cross the border, mostly of Tigrinya descent.   
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UNHCR notes that the Kunama are a more vulnerable population than the 
Tigrinya because they are less likely to receive external financial support from family and 
friends, have less formal education, and are less familiar with modern technology.  The 
refugees typically live in makeshift shelters constructed of mud bricks or mud and tree 
limbs.  The Kunama tend to construct circular houses with conical roofs made of thick 
grasses.  As in most refugee camps, there are limited options for economic activities.  For 
women, life is consumed by preparing food, washing clothes, gathering water and 
firewood, and caring for their children.  Men, in contrast, pass the time by playing bingo, 
discussing issues, and drinking arake (locally brewed liquor), beer, or tea107.  Life in a 
refugee camp can be characterized more aptly as the right not to die rather than the right 
to live.  Restrictions placed upon refugees by the country of asylum often make it 
difficult for engaging in any sort of productive activities.  Prone to becoming protracted 
situations in which refugees are warehoused at sites for over five years, resettlement 
becomes a necessary option when repatriation is not foreseeable.  For the Kunama, a 
continually volatile relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea despite the peace 
agreement, along with seemingly discriminatory political policies, made hopes of ever 
returning to Eritrea diminish further.  
Educational and Social Programming 
 When refugee camp situations move from temporary to protracted, humanitarian 
aid organizations find themselves in emergency situations of providing means to a 
livelihood that extends beyond the basics of food and shelter.  Education, health care, 
social activities, and creative outlets for expression are vital to the healthy development 
of both children and adults housed in camps.  As the crisis of finding durable solutions 
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for Kunama and other Eritrean refugees became critical in Ethiopia, psychosocial 
programming became more integrated into both Wa’ala Nihibi and Shimelba to create a 
more constructive environment for their inhabitants.  In 2001, the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC), along with UNHCR, implemented educational systems into the camp 
in order to “re-introduce this unique group of children to the classroom and help them 
overcome their losses through meaningful, structured activities.”  The project, “entitled 
‘Emergency Education and Psychosocial Support for Kunama Refugee Children and 
Adolescents in Ethiopia’ provided educational and recreational activities for 550 children 
and youth between the ages of 5 and 25”108.  Although refugee camps are never ideal 
situations for asylum, the presence of programming serves to lessen the impact of being 
placed in such a situation and attempts to allow the camp’s occupants to live as normal a 
life as possible until a more permanent solution is found. 
 When implementing camp-wide initiatives, the participation of the refugees in 
their own decision-making process is a vital but underused resource.  Especially for the 
Kunama who came into camps having a historic inability to self-determine their fate and 
to play a role in the governance of their country, participation can be a valuable first step 
towards greater independence and preparation for self-sufficiency.  Refugee participation, 
however, “probably has the worst ratio of rhetoric to reality of any concept in the refugee 
field.”  While constraints include the preference of host countries, the reluctance of 
NGOs to make participation a priority, cultural barriers, conflicts within the refugee 
population, and the absence of qualified community organizers, the benefits of 
participation are numerous: it enhances self-esteem, acts as a coping mechanism, reduces 
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feelings of isolation and unimportance, and promotes protection109.  Keeping this in mind, 
IRC programming in Ethiopia sought the help of the refugee community at all phases of 
their educational projects, involving the input of community members, parents of those 
children who would be attending the schools, and camp leaders110.  Establishing 
programming thus became an additional source of mobilizing the community and 
organizing the Kunama to take an active role in their future.       
 As of 1997, the UNHCR found that “only a quarter of UNHCR assisted minors, 6 
to 17 years of age, attend school, and boys outnumber girls two to one”.  To remedy this 
discrepancy and the lasting impact of children in refugee camps missing integral years of 
educational development, the IRC added education as a primary intervention measure111.  
The stated goal of the IRC’s educational programs in Wa’ala Nihibi was “to provide 
meaningful and constructive learning opportunities for the Kunama refugee children 
living in temporary asylum in northern Ethiopia”112.  A National Project Manager was 
hired, trained, and assigned to oversee the selection and training of community teachers 
and youth leaders as well as the purchase and distribution of educational and recreational 
materials.  The secondary objective of the IRC was “to increase refugee communities’ 
capacity to respond to the protection and psychosocial needs of their children.”  By 
integrating the community’s input with a Parent-Teacher Association of over 100 
members and the training of community committees through workshops113, adults were 
held accountable for taking an active role in the education of their children and 
participating in the overall well-being of the camp youth.  
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 Providing educational materials to the Kunama proved extremely difficult, as 
their native language is spoken by so few people.  The development of a curriculum for 
the camp school included the limited Kunama language books that were carried across 
the border by the refugees themselves, as well as local textbooks and teacher guides that 
were obtained114.  The older generations of Kunama were highly educated before the 
border conflict arose, and are known for being fluent in several languages, including 
Kunama, Tigrinya, Arabic, English, and Italian.  Many had previously studied at 
universities either in Asmara or Addis Ababa and returned to their home communities to 
share their acquired knowledge with others.  Today, however, younger children are 
illiterate in both Kunama and Tigrinya, while in addition a firm knowledge of English 
and/or Amharic is required to be able to continue their studies beyond high school in 
either Eritrea or Ethiopia, respectively.  Camp leaders informed the IRC upon arrival that 
the current generation lacks even the basic numeral skills that are necessary to properly 
keep track of livestock115.   
 Having to start from scratch, then, community leaders and teachers were forced to 
get creative in procuring adequate educational materials.  Teachers fluent in Tigrinya 
began translating textbooks into Kunama so that they could use the handwritten version 
for teaching, and picture books became valuable resources to teach subjects such as 
science and to develop the children’s vocabulary116.  Having to construct an education 
structure in a true emergency setting created an urgent need for resourcefulness from 
humanitarian leaders and Kunama community leaders alike as they found ways to make 
up for and further their children’s lost years of schooling.   
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 Educational programming not only benefits the children in acquiring a knowledge 
base and widening their opportunities for the future, but “for the Eritrean Kunama 
refugees who sought refuge in northern Ethiopia due to persecution, the witnessing of 
killings and violence, coerced conscription into armies, and forced migration – a daily 
routine of normalizing activities for children and adolescents was welcomed”117.  Being 
able to focus on learning can act as a coping mechanism and a source of hope for refugee 
children.  When idleness is seen as the “principal source of misery in the refugee 
camp”118, occupying children and adults alike with meaningful activity is a vital piece of 
overall psychosocial health.  While some children may require more intensive 
psychological intervention and counseling to recover from trauma and loss, many other 
children “recover remarkably well if their basic survival needs are met and they have the 
social support and intellectual and physical stimulation that an education program can 
provide”119.  Education is a basic human right, and the structure it provides has the added 
benefits of shortening the process of trauma recovery and establishing normalization.  
Providing opportunities for development is integral for populations like the Kunama who 
have a history of marginalization and have been denied equitable access to resources in 
the past.     
Resettlement in a Third Country 
 Resettlement is a leap of faith for refugees who choose to apply for it.  Not only 
are they deciding to move to a different country, but they are also giving up hope on the 
possibility of returning to their homeland.  It is extremely difficult to know how long to 
wait for a political or social situation to change in such a way that repatriation becomes a 
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safe option, although it is always the most desired option for both refugees and refugee 
resettlement organizations.  For Oumer Abdelawel, a 35-year old former journalist from 
Eritrea, being resettled to New Zealand was only the lesser of two evils.  Realizing that 
his economic well-being and career path were dependent on his ability to speak his native 
language, he knows that “the further I go from home, the more my cherished dream of 
growing as a professional journalist withers away…If there were any prospects of going 
home in the near future, I would prefer staying some more time in the camp to 
resettlement”120.  Resettlement is a frightening process no matter where refugees are 
coming from, and often a dangerous situation that is familiar can be more desirable than 
facing the unknown.  Such was the case for several hundred ethnic Kunama who 
withdrew their applications for resettlement in 2007, citing a sense of kinship and a 
strong desire to remain near to the lands of their ancestors121.  Still, others had made up 
their minds that the prospect of returning home was not a feasible option for the future, 
and braved the resettlement process to escape spending more years confined to a camp. 
 The bureaucratic process surrounding applications for resettlement in a third 
country can be an added stressor in itself, as the international refugee regime falls 
critically short of being able to accommodate the millions of people in need worldwide.  
No more than 1 percent of refugees end up being offered resettlement in a third 
country122, so the impetus to care for refugees within host countries and to prevent the 
political and economic crises that create refugees in the first place is essential.  At a time 
of confusion and desperation in their lives, refugees in camps or elsewhere often have to 
                                                 
120
 Egziabher, K. G. (6 April 2005). 
121
 Egziabher, K. G. (5 July 2007). Eritrean refugees fly out of Ethiopia for a new life in the united states. 
UNHCR, Retrieved 20 February 2008, from http://wwww.reliefweb.int/ 
122
 Loescher, G. (1993), 148. 
 48 
seek out the resources necessary to apply for asylum and contact the proper authorities.  
With the burden of proof of persecution placed on the refugee, “the administrative 
procedures associated with obtaining asylum are arduous, stressful, and often continue 
for many years”123.  In the biography of Valentino Achak Deng, a Sudanese refugee, Dave 
Eggers tells of the emotional rollercoaster that accompanies the resettlement process: 
 “When the first resettlement flights departed, there were celebrations all over 
Kakuma, and I went with Achor Achor to the airfield to watch the planes disappear.  
I was overjoyed for these young men, fully believing that I would soon join them in 
America.  As the flights continued, though, as I heard the near-constant news of the 
good fortune of this boy and that boy, I became numb to their happiness, and could 
only question my own inadequacies.  Perhaps five hundred young men left, and as 
the months passed and I received no word from the UN, I became less happy for 
those who had been chosen…Each week there was incalculable joy for them and 
devastation for the rest of us”124.  
 
Navigating the resettlement process is incredibly difficult without access to immigration 
lawyers who are well-versed in the system’s complexities, but it can also place an 
obstacle to seeking safety in the way of those who are overwhelmed and confused.  The 
millions of people who are denied asylum along with the few who are accepted can create 
rifts in societies and further destroy the cohesiveness of a cultural or ethnic group.  For 
those who are accepted for resettlement, however, there is often a mixture of joy in future 
prospects, sorrow for what they are leaving behind, and a whole host of adjustment 
difficulties ahead of them. 
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Chapter 3: Kunama in the United States 
“Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to breathe free.” 
-Inscription on the Statue of Liberty, New York City 
 
 The United States espouses a “tradition of being a safe haven for the oppressed,” 
with a policy of admitting those refugees who are of particular humanitarian concern.  
Historically, the first official refugee legislation that went into effect was the Displaced 
Persons Act of 1948 following World War II, which provided for the admittance of some 
400,000 displaced Europeans.  Future laws enabled the U.S. to welcome people fleeing 
communist regimes.  After the fall of the Vietnamese regime in 1975, the hundreds of 
thousands of Indochinese seeking resettlement pushed Congress to restructure their 
procedures and standardize a system for the on-going acceptance of refugees.  In 1980, 
they passed the Refugee Act which makes provisions for the normal flow of people into 
the country as well as emergency precautions to be taken in the event of a larger and 
more desperate humanitarian crisis.  Federal assistance was authorized to be used for the 
resettlement of refugees, and the system remains a joint partnership between the public 
and private sectors, with federal organizations and funding working closely with non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) to facilitate the entrance, support, and adjustment of 
new arrivals125.  
 The U.S. resettles more refugees than any other country worldwide, although host 
countries and asylum countries technically house millions more.  Since the Refugee Act 
came into existence, annual admissions figures averaged around 98,000 people126, 
although after the increase in homeland security brought on by the tragedies of 
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September 11, 2001, the rate has been cut in half, with just over 41,000 refugees coming 
to the U.S. in 2006127.  Cognizant of the humanitarian burden on Ethiopia because of the 
plight of Eritrean refugees and the lack of any durable solution, starting in 2007 the 
UNHCR began referring the Kunama for resettlement.  Over 1,200 Kunama out of a 
camp population of 4,000 were recommended to the U.S. for resettlement 
consideration128, the others having opted out, perhaps hoping for eventual repatriation or 
an unwillingness to leave that which was familiar to them.  While some viewed 
resettlement in the U.S. as an opportunity for safety and more productive lives, others 
preferred to retain closer ties to their homeland and families.    
Two Cases from Boston 
 To understand the problems that Kunama refugees face upon resettling in the 
U.S., interviews were conducted with two such refugees to illuminate the personal 
struggles they face.  Each refugee carries individual stories with them when crossing 
national boundaries (See Appendix 4 for interview questions).  The study was explained 
to the participants prior to participating, and informed consent was obtained according to 
the guidelines of the Boston College Institutional Review Board (IRB) (Appendix 5).  
The participants agreed to the use of their first names along with their stories.  
Precautions were taken to ensure that participants were allowed to ask questions and felt 
free to decline to answer any question.  Although I originally received IRB approval to 
conduct interviews with all six of the Kunama resettled by the IRC this year, my study 
was eventually cut to a sample size of two, mostly due to the language barrier (see IRB 
Research Summary Appendix 6).  In addition, one potential participant unexpectedly out-
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migrated to Las Vegas prior to the study.  With the two participants who were 
interviewed, no translator was used, as none were available and both interviewees were 
deemed to have sufficient English skills to understand and respond to basic questions.   
 I got to know Marco and Mikele, along with four other Kunama refugee men, 
while interning at the IRC.  After making an appointment, the two were kind enough to 
come to the office to be interviewed.  Marco was especially interested in the purpose of 
the interview, which I explained would enable me to help other people understand better 
who the Kunama are and where he is coming from.  I asked questions that would enable 
them to share a bit of their story: when they were in refugee camps, when they came to 
the U.S., and why they fled Eritrea.  The bulk of the questions addressed their adjustment 
once they arrived in the U.S., including how the Kunama culture differs from the 
American culture, what adjustments such as English they have found the most difficult, 
what they like and dislike about the U.S. so far, and what makes them feel the most at 
home in the U.S.  All of these questions were structured to address the similarities and 
differences between the two cultures: Kunama and American.  
 Marco and Mikele both arrived in the U.S. on September 4, 2007, just about the 
same time I began working at the IRC, so I was able to witness their adjustment process 
firsthand from the start.  As a small sample size, although two case studies provide very 
little information that can be inferred to a wider population, the stories of Marco and 
Mikele are central to showing detailed examples of the resettlement process and provide 
a human face to a wider crisis that can often seem distant.  Understanding another culture 
becomes much more meaningful and effective through the mutual learning associated 
with human interaction and intercultural dialogue.  Considering the limited print sources 
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available that discuss the Kunama, it was especially vital to obtain information directly 
from the source given the scope of this study.     
 Although both men bring with them very different stories, both felt forced to flee 
their home country as members of the Kunama ethnic group and spent a significant 
amount of time in refugee camps in Ethiopia before coming to the U.S.  Knowing that as 
soon as he finished high school he would face forced conscription into the Eritrean armed 
forces, Marco fled to Shimelba in August of 2005.  He did not like the prospect of being 
coerced into combat for a long time without being able to see his family, although by 
fleeing he is still not able to see his family, all of whom still live in Eritrea.  Wary of the 
government’s manipulative strategies for getting rid of political opposition, Marco also 
noted that many people were disappearing at this time and faced jail or financial 
punishment for evading military service or other opposition activities.  Since the EPLF 
became the only political party in Eritrea, any deviant thinking was seen as dangerous 
and threatening to the national unity the country is still working to create since obtaining 
independence just fifteen years ago.   
 Grateful for the chance to resettle after two years of living in Shimelba, Marco 
continues to give off an incredibly positive attitude about his life.  Appreciative of the 
diplomacy and the democratic ideals of the American government, he claims that 
absolutely nothing is similar between the two countries, particularly noting gender roles.  
Despite the Kunama being known as an especially gender egalitarian society, Marco 
discussed how in Eritrea man is the ruler and his wife is the helper.  Violence was more 
pervasive and accepted, made evident in the discipline of both women and children.  As a 
critical voice within his culture, Marco appreciates the political freedom in the U.S. as he 
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adjusts to a new one.  Having made it through one Boston winter and his first encounter 
with snow, it seems that life can only improve for him as he adapts to a steady job and 
improving his English. 
 Having lived in refugee camps since they were first established for Eritreans in 
Ethiopia, Mikele had a much longer road towards coming to the U.S.  Before arriving in 
Shimelba, Mikele was one of the original Kunama in Wa’ala Nihibi, arriving there when 
he was just 14 years old without his family.  Like Marco, he wanted to escape forced 
military conscription and “just wanted to live” rather than being subject to dangerous and 
potentially fatal military conflict.  The Kunama in Ethiopia and Eritrea are the same, he 
says, so perhaps it was difficult to see the purpose behind fighting a war against kinfolk 
separated by a highly contested border.  Mikele is also the first from his family to move 
to the U.S., and still has family members both back in Eritrea and currently living in 
Shimelba.  Although he concurs with Marco that “nothing is the same,” the two seem to 
be handling things well just six months after their arrival.  Throughout resettlement, the 
IRC was critical in finding an apartment for Marco and Mikele, helping them practice 
English, providing financial assistance, and searching for jobs.  I will continue to refer to 
these cases as they illuminate wider refugee adjustment issues that arise during the 
resettlement process in the U.S.       
Journey to the United States 
 The Kunama provide a particularly difficult resettlement case due to their lack of 
education, extremely limited English skills, a history of agricultural and pastoral 
economic activities that are not marketable in the U.S., and drastically different cultural 
traditions.  Unfamiliar with urban city life, effective support immediately upon arrival in 
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the U.S. is critical for this “particularly vulnerable group requiring special patience and 
attention.”  Very few Kunama have relatives or friends already settled in the U.S., as this 
is the first time in history that they have been resettled to a third country in mass 
numbers129.  In addition to a deficient education, socio-cultural differences make the 
transition especially difficult considering the atypical family structures of the Kunama.  
Keeping families together remains critical in refugee resettlement, but this is made more 
difficult when single Kunama women often have children with multiple partners and 
there are a number of unofficial marriages within the people group130.  It is also common 
in the camps to have single adults who have left their families behind in Eritrea, as is the 
case with Marco and Mikele, making it incredibly difficult for those who leave to 
maintain family ties once they are resettled. 
The first group of 29 Kunama flew out of Addis Ababa in July 2007 after a 
typical 3-5 day pre-departure cultural orientation session conducted by the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM).  Over the course of a few months, up until September, 
some 700 Kunama would depart northern Ethiopia for various U.S. cities including 
Atlanta, Orlando, Seattle, Las Vegas, and Boston.  UNHCR had determined “that the 700 
Kunamas cannot return home in safety and dignity and resettlement is the most suitable 
solution.”  Tokko Masso Anduku, leaving for Atlanta with her husband and three 
children, was optimistic about the move having heard from previously resettled friends 
that they appreciated life in America and the expanded educational and working 
opportunities.  She was also worried, however, because of the cultural differences: “We 
are just illiterate farmers from rural Eritrea and adapting to a modern lifestyle in a 
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community whose language we do not understand worries me a lot”131.  Moving to a new 
country brings with it multiple anxieties and uncertainties about the future, but after 
living in Shimelba for over six years hope for a more fruitful lifestyle and the promise of 
safety can begin to outweigh the fears. 
 Upon arrival in the U.S., NGOs such as the IRC, Catholic Charities, and Lutheran 
World Relief often work to facilitate their client’s successful cultural transition and to 
help them move towards self-sufficiency.  Services include language classes, case 
management, employment, and financial/material assistance, all of which will be 
discussed further.  Especially for the Kunama, immediate referral for English training 
classes is vital, both for general cultural adjustment and for obtaining the necessary skills 
to acquire a job and/or to go to school.  The more that resettled refugees can begin to rely 
on themselves rather than on other people and organizations to provide for their needs the 
better, as independence revives a sense of self-respect that is often so hard to maintain 
while living in a refugee camp or through dealing with past experiences of trauma.  
Language Barriers 
 Marco had the unusual opportunity to be able to attend high school in Eritrea 
before he left, and received a general education in science, math, and languages in the 
city of Duta until 2003.  He is fluent in Kunama and Tigrinya, with intermediate level 
English skills.  Also fluent in Kunama and Tigrinya with a basic proficiency in English, 
Mikele went to three years of primary school in Gonye, Eritrea for science, math, and 
English before fleeing at the height of the border war in 2000 like so many others.  Not 
all the Kunama have received such an education, however.  Three of the other Kunama 
who resettled at the same time came to the U.S. with no English skills aside from what 
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they had picked up during cultural orientation in the refugee camps, having spent their 
lives herding cows rather than attending school.  “Him: school.  Me: Cows,” one such 
Kunama man said, explaining his lack of English skills to me at the IRC.  Although I can 
tell that Marco and Mikele’s English has significantly improved since they first came to 
the U.S., Marco suggested that he was only a “little better,” while Mikele insists that his 
English is not better at all.  Communication can be a source of embarrassment when 
talking to native English speakers, so it is important to encourage English language 
learners to enable them to see how much they have improved.  If not, refugees may be in 
danger of isolating themselves further from the new culture because they do not want to 
attempt to communicate with Americans.   
 For millions of people currently living in the United States, English is not their 
native language.  The 2000 census reported 20 million inhabitants with “poor English” 
skills and another 10 million inhabitants as having no ability to speak English, a 
significant increase from the preceding decade132.  Not being able to understand and be 
understood complicates all aspects of life, from communicating with doctors in receiving 
medical care, educational performance, obtaining a job, navigating transportation 
systems, and connecting with people in the local population.  Although many social 
service agencies, and refugee resettlement organizations in particular, try to hire a multi-
lingual staff to be able to function as translators with clients, the vast number of different 
languages people come into the country speaking makes it impossible to account for each 
one.  Kunama is one such language that is particularly rare because it is spoken by such a 
small number of people: less than 100,000 in the world.  Even as migrants to the U.S. 
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continue to improve in English speaking and comprehension skills, it is remarkable how 
within daily conversations “the references to a shared heritage of literature, music, film, 
and television are endless”133.  Learning a language in the context of another country 
cannot begin to account for the cultural references and idiomatic expressions that are 
embedded in language.  Even for proficient or fluent English speakers coming to the U.S. 
it can take months or years to become a well-versed conversationalist. 
 Medical care is an area that is particularly difficult without a translator, especially 
in the realm of mental health when diagnoses are dependent on conversations with the 
patient.  It is vital to have access to skilled interpreters who are fluent in both languages 
in order to navigate the U.S. health care system and to reach an accurate diagnosis.  With 
only three official Kunama interpreters currently in the U.S., it is common for small 
refugee groups to have no accessible translation services.  When no trained medical 
interpreter is available, patients often have to rely on family members who are more 
proficient in English and can act as unofficial interpreters.  In fact, “the vast majority of 
interpreters used in mental health have no formal training”134.  Using family members can 
create an additional host of problems, however, as a 1988 study in Britain of Gujarati-
speaking patients from India showed that 70% was the best accuracy that could be 
expected when meaning is lost in translation.  Additional difficulties include inadequate 
language skills (even if they are more proficient, English is not likely the interpreter’s 
first language), hierarchical family dynamics, the stress of being emotionally attached to 
the patient in need while being forced to take on an extremely important role, cultural or 
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religious beliefs, and the embarrassment that can accompany having to speak bluntly in 
front of a loved one135.  Until the Kunama have a reliable network of migrants in the U.S. 
who are widely available and have been trained in medical terminology and cultural 
differences, finding effective health care will remain a major source of stress upon their 
group during the resettlement process.     
Case Management 
 The resettlement process begins with case management services that assist 
refugees in all aspects of transitioning into life in the U.S.  Marco and Mikele’s Case 
Manager at the IRC, also named Marco, is originally a refugee himself from the Sudan.  
Case managers find and furnish apartments prior to the refugee’s arrival, setting up 
phones, heat, and internet if available, arrange transport from the airport to the apartment, 
conduct orientation at the apartment, and assist with filling out forms for welfare 
services, food stamps, and medical forms.  As the initial contact, case managers also refer 
refugees for other services within the resettlement office such as employment.  Often new 
arrivals will also need medical assistance, and case managers act as liaisons between 
doctors and patients, accompanying them to appointments along with translation services 
if necessary.  Marco and Mikele’s case manager was essential in finding them an 
apartment in Chelsea, a city highly concentrated with immigrants and refugees, where 
they now live with one other refugee who is also Kunama. 
 Particularly with people groups who have very little exposure to modern 
technology and urban living, familiarizing refugees such as the Kunama with material 
amenities can be a chore in itself.  Coming from some of the most remote areas of 
Eritrea, many Kunama have previously only traveled by foot, camel, or donkey cart.  Life 
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in the camps exposes refugees to the vehicles of humanitarian aid workers, and may 
make them aware of technology such as electricity and television, but in general the 
Kunama have had very little direct experience with either.  Running water, electric 
stoves, ovens, and refrigerators are all likely to be unfamiliar to a Kunama refugee136.  
Case management thus starts with the basics, and is a constant process of educating new 
arrivals about all aspects of life. 
 Tasks that are simple to the average American such as paying bills, grocery 
shopping, and using public transportation are often extremely unfamiliar to new refugees 
and have to be learned with patience and perseverance.  Case managers require a 
significant amount of support in service to refugees, and volunteers are essential in the 
office to alleviate their amount of work.  Family mentors, for example, are volunteers 
who act as cultural educators and spend extra time building a relationship with the 
refugees in their homes, helping them through daily tasks, providing extra English 
language instruction, and answering any questions they may have about the U.S.  
Providing these friendships is essential both for reducing the burden of assistance placed 
upon case managers and refugee resettlement offices in general as well as for giving 
refugees more people to connect with who come from the culture to which they are 
attempting to assimilate.  Without cultural connections that provide opportunities to 
practice English, refugees who live in community with one another are in danger of never 
fully transitioning into a new culture. 
Employment 
 Refugee resilience is also evident in the low-paying, entry-level jobs they are 
forced to take in order to obtain an income and achieve the self-sufficiency that is 
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necessary to be taken off welfare.  The most common jobs that are sought for refugees 
with little to no English skills are dishwashing in restaurants, strenuous warehouse work, 
and other simple labor or manufacturing jobs that are usually paid at minimum wage.  
Even those who come to the United States with high levels of training in their home 
countries and English fluency need to lower their job expectations in order to gain 
employment experience.  For example, migrants trained as dentist general practitioners 
can only be dental assistants in America because of different school and licensure 
requirements.  A managerial-level electrical engineer from Iraq now works in data entry.  
A well-trained Military General with multiple post-graduate degrees from the Gambia 
now works as a security guard.  Adapting to a new culture often means giving up hopes 
and dreams that people may have originally had for their lives in order to survive.  The 
unstable political conditions and civil conflicts that create refugees can be sudden, 
causing people to flee their country unexpectedly and often live in refugee camps across a 
border before being granted asylum in another country.  Survival thus takes precedence 
over other needs and desires. 
 Employment services become crucial immediately to help a family obtain 
opportunities for work.  For the IRC, “the goal of employment is to both prepare clients 
to enter the American workforce through counseling, resume building, application 
practice, interview preparation, and job searching as well as place clients in jobs as early 
as possible so that they can achieve economic self-sufficiency”137.  Not only do jobs 
provide for the economic betterment of a refugee family, but it “adds greatly to the 
integrity of families who seek to establish themselves in a new country and provide for 
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their own needs”138.  Job training is thus both an economic necessity as well as a 
supportive force for human dignity and independence.     
 In terms of marketable economic skills, Marco volunteered in Barentu hospital 
while he was in high school and later was able to work as a tailor while living in 
Shimelba.  His English is quickly improving, and at 24 years old he now works at the 
airport as a baggage handler full-time.  The hardest adjustment to make for Marco was 
the language difference, but coming from high school Marco arrived with far superior 
language skills than many of his Kunama counterparts.  “America is good,” he stated, 
because “in my country life is not a life.”  Although Marco’s shifts at the airport often 
begin at 4:00 AM, his outlook remains incredibly positive and he seems to appreciate the 
chance to be economically self-sufficient.  Rarely seen around the IRC office anymore, a 
job has helped to provide Marco with needed independence as he establishes a life for 
himself in this new country.   
 Job prospects are similar for the other four Kunama men who arrived at the same 
time as Marco.  A shepherd and a shopkeeper in Shimelba is now a dishwasher at a small 
Japanese restaurant.  Another shepherd from Koluku is a dishwasher at Bertucci’s Italian 
restaurant.  A farmer back home in Koluku, Eritrea and a volunteer high school teacher 
and shopkeeper in Shimelba is now a boxing and packing attendant at a company that 
makes soup.  Another farmer in Koluku with less English skills began at the same 
company, but was unable to handle the fast-paced environment and is now a sanitation 
worker and a stocking attendant at Abercrombie & Fitch.  Initial job experiences can be 
difficult and frustrating, especially without the necessary language ability to adequately 
communicate with employers and co-workers.  Hiring a refugee comes with a lot of 
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benefits because they are typically hard-working and can bring cultural understanding 
and diversity to a workforce, but sometimes they may also require additional 
accommodations, time, and patience to explain their responsibilities.    
 Mikele was able to earn some extra money in the camps as a talented necklace 
designer and a tailor in Shimelba, two skills that he brought with him to the U.S.  Life is 
incredibly different between Eritrea and the U.S. for Mikele, especially in the realm of 
economic activities.  Known for communal living, the Kunama were used to life as 
farmers, without the worry of paying rent for a house.  Mikele noted that you can retain a 
sustainable lifestyle by farming your own food and sharing life with your neighbors, 
seeking an outside job only if you need extra money.  “That’s a good life,” Mikele 
recalls.  It was the “wrong” fight with Ethiopia that disrupted this good life for him, 
bringing violence and anxiety into the mainstream for Eritreans.   
 The hardest adjustment for him to make to the U.S. was reaching an 
understanding of why he needed to work in the first place, considering his farming 
background as a child.  At first he did not want to work, because it was something he was 
not accustomed to, but once he arrived he began to comprehend just how necessary 
money was with rent to pay, food to buy, and other critical expenses such as health care.  
Mikele also found employment as a baggage handler at the airport, also often having to 
get up early for a shift that begins at 4:00 AM and sometimes lasts until the evening.  He 
is optimistic, however, saying “I can see that life is good now because everyone is 
working.”  Money, along with continuing to learn things like English and driving, 
motivate him to work for an improved future.  At only 22 years old, Mikele may still 
have time to go back to school and continue to improve his job prospects.  For the 
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moment, however, it is difficult for either Marco or Mikele to think about the future.  
Having gotten used to a life of being worried about survival and making it through one 
day at a time, they cannot even begin to think about what they will be doing in five or ten 
years, although it is a common interview question used in American culture.    
 The perseverance necessary to endure physically demanding jobs along with 
learning a new language and trying to understand a new culture make the lives of both 
immigrants and refugees uniquely difficult.  Despite all the disadvantages associated with 
immigrant or refugee status, particularly financial strain, these groups of people show an 
incredible ability to persevere.  By drawing on support from both the host culture and 
their ethnic culture, they are able to acculturate while still maintaining a healthy identity.  
Children and adolescents in particular seem to show more ease in adaptation than their 
parents, which can result in higher school performance and less behavioral problems than 
nonimmigrant children139.  Inevitably immigrant and refugee populations will all face a 
variety of challenges and individuals differ greatly in their abilities to acculturate, but 
resilience seems to be the most prevalent factor uniting all of these people together and 
leading to their success in a new society.  Having the chance to start a new life in an 
unfamiliar culture, although difficult, always retains the capacity for hope.   
Mental Health 
 In the area of refugee mental health, problems can arise on both sides of the 
continental divide, prior to leaving the home country and upon arrival in the host country.  
Unfortunately, trauma experienced in home country conflict situations are never 
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forgotten, and often continue to be manifested in the refugee’s experience of Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) on top of cultural adjustment difficulties and for many 
the pressures of learning a new language.  Refugees share many transitional difficulties 
with immigrants in terms of adjusting to a new culture, region, and learning a new 
language, but sometimes have to deal with added trauma associated with the situations 
under which they were forced to flee from home and the likely persecution that caused 
them to seek asylum in another country.  Supporting the mental health of refugees 
alongside helping them transition into housing, jobs, and economic self-sufficiency is 
thus a vital aspect of social service in the field of refugee resettlement. 
Like anyone who is uprooted, grieving the loss of one culture coexists with 
adjusting to a new culture.  Different people have varying responses to this cultural 
transition.  Some may cling to the culture they have left behind, idealizing it and finding 
it difficult to accept the new culture as valuable.  On the reverse side of the spectrum, 
refugees may idealize the host society and quickly discard the values of their past culture, 
assimilating rapidly without retaining a healthy balance of what has been lost.  Culture 
shock can be experienced both as cultural bereavement of the former culture and 
threatening to an individual sense of identity.  Even when refugees had experienced 
human rights abuses in their home country, when they “lose their war-torn country 
(which in some sense abused them) [they] may feel physically safe in the country of 
resettlement, but they, too, may fret at the loss of all that is familiar to them”140.  Negative 
feelings about the country of resettlement can limit the ability of refugees to 
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meaningfully engage in life and to take advantage of available opportunities while they 
try to resolve their cultural experiences into a new and firmly-rooted identity. 
Although many studies point to the resilience of migrants and their superior 
mental health, it is still important to recognize the existence of mental health problems in 
immigrant and refugee populations and the specific needs they require from social service 
providers.  A qualitative study from 2006 took a sample of 13 African immigrant families 
in the United States in order to better understand the psychological concerns they had for 
their well-being.  Five self-identified African women identified depression as a major 
health concern for them, largely due to cultural obstacles such as “displacement, housing 
difficulties, language and communication barriers, and problems negotiating medical and 
educational systems.”  Cultural adjustment can also be particularly challenging for 
African women because they face the “dual racism” of being both black and an 
immigrant.  The effect of gender also plays a significant role as female immigrants may 
face shifting gender roles within a new culture and “may need to negotiate or renegotiate 
family expectations and responsibilities which may have consequences for their health 
and well-being.”  Thus, African immigrant women face a host of risk factors for mental 
health problems as they transition into American life. 
Due to the Western conceptualization of depression, study participants were able 
to explain mental health concerns as mostly psychosomatic in nature, emphasizing 
physical symptoms over mood complaints.  The emergence of depressive symptoms was 
linked by the women to seven factors: change and expectations, parenting 
responsibilities, gender role strain, difficulties with systems, financial concerns, racism, 
and social isolation.  In addition to all these environmental stressors, it is difficult for 
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immigrant women to find help because of the stigma placed on mental health concerns, 
especially in their culture.  A distrust of American medicine leads women to find other 
sources of therapy such as social support.  The previous coping mechanism used to deal 
with depressive symptoms was silence, but the study encouraged women participating to 
engage in mutually beneficial dialogue in the form of group therapy to discuss their 
similar concerns.  Group counseling was a much more acceptable form of help to the 
participating women, shedding light on how to provide more effective physical and 
psychological health care to this population as a unique group with specific needs141. 
Although many immigrants are able to adjust easily and may even show advantages when 
compared to their nonimmigrant counterparts, immigrants still face unique psychological 
concerns associated with acculturation and environmental stressors. 
Although refugees do not choose to migrate to a new country like immigrants do, 
they otherwise face many of the same problems in terms of acculturation and adjustment.  
Refugees face a unique blend of both pre- and post-migration stress factors.  Pre-
migration stressors include “torture, forced labor, starvation, observed violence, and 
murder/loss of family members,” and post-migration stressors can include “limited 
English-speaking skills, unemployment, and poverty” that are “associated with major 
depression and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).”  In fact, “refugees resettled in 
Western countries are 10 times more likely to have PTSD compared to age-matched 
general populations”142.  This combination of stressors makes refugees a population that is 
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at high-risk for depression in a new country.  Not only are they often undergoing a loss of 
their culture in trying to assimilate to become functional citizens in the host country, but 
their losses are often compounded by a loss of family, loved ones, and material 
possessions before, during, and after the move.   
Despite these difficulties, there is always resilience evident in the lives of 
refugees receiving help at the IRC in Boston.  The refugees I have had the opportunity to 
work with are generally receptive to our help, willing to begin employment as soon as 
possible, and eager to learn more English.  The ability to smile, laugh, and make jokes is 
a universal coping mechanism that I have found integral in social service to refugees.  
Although I am on the side of helping them to acculturate to the United States, it is clear 
that they also require the social support of others from the same ethnicity.  Immigrant and 
refugee groups form communities and engage in activities with one another in order to 
maintain vital aspects of their ethnic identity.  The Kunama people, for example, have 
access to an Eritrean Community Center in Boston that hosts events for all the Eritreans 
in the surrounding area.  By creating organizations, living with one another, and helping 
one another with communication through language translation, refugees are able to 
maintain pieces of their home country and create a healthy ethnic identity while adapting 
to a new culture. 
Interventions and Coping Mechanisms  
 The plethora of adjustment issues when resettling to a new country can be 
frustrating, overwhelming, and time-consuming.  Throughout the period of cultural 
adjustment, however, there are many effective coping mechanisms that alleviate the 
stress of being uprooted and being forced to adapt to something that is unfamiliar.  
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Certain protective factors that give refugees a support base for confronting cultural and 
identity conflicts are: a positive personality disposition, a supportive family environment, 
and external societal agencies that act as a resource and reinforce coping efforts143.  
Although primarily applied to children, these protective factors are applicable to the 
Kunama adults who have journeyed to the U.S. as well.  It is important to note the 
pervasive impact a refugee’s personality can have on his or her ability to adapt easily, 
because psychosocial support must vary from person to person to best cater to specific 
needs.  Marco, for example, is a bit older than Mikele, spent less time in camps, has a 
higher level of education, and has a calm, easygoing, flexible, and hard-working 
disposition.  All these character traits have aided him in establishing himself as a resident 
of the U.S. and are perhaps attributable for the more favorable outlook he has on his life 
now as compared to Mikele’s general sense of hope that is tinted with reservations.   
Although few of the Kunama refugees that have been resettled in Boston have the 
benefit of familial support as a helpful protective factor, social support within their ethnic 
group remains a useful aspect of their daily lives.  While living with each other 
discourages them from practicing English by allowing them to use their native tongue, it 
also provides a network of people who have relatable experiences and an unprecedented 
understanding of the cultural background and circumstances from which each refugee 
fled.  Marco and Mikele have been fortunate enough to find a job at the same place, often 
with overlapping shifts, so they are able to help each other by navigating the public 
transportation system together on their way to work and being able to explain lingual or 
cultural disparities that spark confusion.  The Eritrean Community Center of Boston, 
founded in 1983, acts as one such meeting grounds for promoting social cohesion among 
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the group and benefiting from the knowledge of others.  The center’s mission statement 
states that it “works to promote social and cultural interactions among Eritrean-
Americans as well as area residents and friends for mutual understanding and awareness, 
integration, economic self-sufficiency, Eritrean heritage, and youth leadership”144.  Even 
among refugees from other countries it can be useful to share experiences, which was the 
impetus behind the IRC starting a “Newcomer’s Group” this year that meets in a social 
setting and encompasses a wide range of cultures.      
 When resettled refugees are struggling disproportionately in comparison to their 
peers, it can be incredibly valuable to provide therapeutic structures to help them deal 
with their emotions considering the high level of mental health risk within their 
population.  Particularly for refugees suffering from clinical PTSD, depression, or 
anxiety, as conditions defined by Western culture, there are a number of barriers that 
prevent access to mental health service.  Disallowing cultural healing practices that 
refugees may traditionally adhere to in favor of Western medicine exclusively may be 
counterproductive to the overall health of refugees as they attempt to merge two cultures 
into a new identity.  Mental health conditions are often highly stigmatized in refugee 
populations, because of cultural or religious beliefs that suggest mental health is familial 
and can reduce the marriage prospects of other family members, illness as attributable to 
past family transgressions and therefore damaging to one’s reputation, and the fear that 
seeking help for mental illness will result in deportation or a loss of governmental 
benefits145.  Any psychological interventions thus must include an understanding of 
cultural practices and attempt to reach a convergence of the two approaches both out of 
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respect for the cultural practices of the refugee and in order to maintain trust between the 
refugee and the Western physician. 
 Psychological support, like any other social service delivery to refugees, begins 
with understanding: “In any cross-cultural work, psychologists have to fight against the 
tendency toward professional distancing by leaving their offices and clinics and spending 
time with refugees in their environment”146.  Informal contact with refugees such as 
joining with them in ethnic celebrations or festivities can be just as valuable as attending 
training workshops and enhances cultural understanding147.  Although research has not 
been conducted specifically with the Kunama in the area of mental health, being 
cognizant of common issues that affect refugees in the United States and other African 
refugee groups as well as the unique cultural background the Kunama are bringing with 
them serves as a backdrop for making logical connections and improving psychosocial 
services.  Although remedial work is important in providing counseling and healing from 
past traumatic experiences, prevention is also a vital part of service to refugees in 
recognizing them as an at-risk group for mental health difficulties and ensuring 
placement of the protective factors that can avert future difficulties.   
Policy Implications 
 Aside from recognizing the need for immediate English language instruction for 
African refugees who come from non-English speaking backgrounds, perhaps the second 
most difficult area of cultural adjustment is in employment support.  As discussed 
previously, jobs that are recognized as a necessity for everyone in American society is 
not always an assumption that refugees have.  The Kunama provide an example of a 
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people group coming from a more communal economic structure to which capitalistic 
society stands in direct contrast.  Case management services provide a basis for 
explaining all the expenses accrued in conjunction with the cost of living in the U.S., and 
employment services cannot assume that everyone will automatically make the 
connection between the high cost of living and the amount of work that will be necessary 
to sustain a reasonable lifestyle.   
 Just as Mikele did not want to work when he first was resettled, an understanding 
of urban life in America has shown him how farming and shepherding are no longer 
options if he wants to be successful.  Although it is important for refugees to begin work 
as soon as possible, adjusting to an entirely new economic system can take an 
extraordinary amount of time and effort.  Seemingly insignificant values such as being 
punctual need to be taught along with interview and job skills so that employment 
services can act as a source of cultural education to provide refugees with the knowledge 
to adapt when their first job begins.  Employment services should coincide with cultural 
training that can dispel any myths that might have been acquired about the U.S. before 
resettlement.  There is an enormous gap between initially placing refugees in jobs and 
continuing to equip them with skills to further their job prospects in the future, something 
the IRC does by offering funding for training programs and educational opportunities.   
 Having a family mentor and other volunteer interactions is also perhaps an 
undervalued source of cultural adjustment for refugees.  Organized opportunities to build 
relationships with Americans are vital to enabling refugees to form relationships outside 
the auspices of the IRC in the future, including relationships with employers and co-
workers.  Simply by offering friendship, American volunteers can sometimes provide 
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valuable English language practice and a cultural understanding of the U.S. that cannot 
always be found in the staff of a refugee resettlement office that often employs former 
refugees from diverse backgrounds.  Having both relationships, those who can directly 
relate to the experience that they refugees are going through, and those who can provide a 
friendly representation of the American culture, are necessary to facilitate adjustment.    
 It is easy for Marco and Mikele to recognize how the IRC has been helpful to 
them over the past six months, citing that the agency found them an apartment, gave them 
opportunities to practice English, provided financial assistance, helped them apply to 
jobs, and offered general help whenever a problem arose.  As clients they feel 
comfortable coming into the office if they have a question or need to be aided through a 
tricky situation such as an unexpected bill in the mail.  When I asked them if there are 
any areas in which the IRC’s services could be improved or do for them something that 
they are not already doing they were unable to answer, although they agreed that as many 
opportunities for English language instruction and practice as possible is important.  
When the Kunama refugees were struggling with their external ESL class or needed to 
learn additional information that the class was not teaching them, language services fell 
to the volunteers in employment services because a formal class or teaching structure for 
dealing with such problems is currently beyond the scope of the IRC’s services.  The 
International Institute of Boston, another refugee resettlement agency, does however offer 
more formal English classes and computer skills training that clients can be referred to.  
When resources are insufficient to provide for a client’s needs, the network of social 
service agencies within the city often comes into play, offering further support to 
refugees.   
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Issues of Psychosocial Support and Care: A Compassionate Response 
 Providing social service assistance to refugees is more of a partnership than a 
helping relationship.  Especially when people are coming from warehousing situations in 
which they were denied fundamental rights to self-determination and had little options for 
participation and choice, equipping newly resettled refugees with the tools to become 
self-sufficient in all areas, not just economically, is beneficial for both sides.  Being able 
to choose and not having to constantly rely on others for one’s livelihood is a 
fundamental aspect of human dignity, and thus an integral component of refugee care and 
assimilation into society.   
 Lending assistance to another is a moral duty upheld by the principle of solidarity 
and the implicit unity of humankind.  In discussing the care of refugees, Drew 
Christiansen declares that “under the principle of solidarity, Catholic social teaching 
holds that affluent nations have the obligation to make sacrifices to close the gap with 
poor lands”148.  The basic fact of one’s wealth in light of another’s poverty requires a 
compassionate response to the extent one is able to help, especially considering the 
interdependence of all nations in the realm of economics and the inequalities that result 
from exploitative relationships.  Helping the other is not simply motivated by 
compassion, but also benefits the country that is helping: “by working to move the 
country to observe universal human rights by extending those rights to peoples-in-
movement, they are enriching the moral quality of our nation”149.  Intervention for the 
sake of justice acts to support the integrity of the intervening nation and to preserve a 
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reputation of moral authority.  Solidarity enables both nations to benefit as globalization 
further entrenches international mutual dependence.  
 Refugees crossing into the U.S. thus come as an opportunity, not a liability; a 
chance to further international solidarity and gain from the mutual learning and 
interdependence that comes from cross-cultural interactions.  Where rights to immigrate 
and seek refuge collide with national sovereignty, the universal common good emerges as 
an overarching guideline.  In an age of universal human rights, the church calls the 
nations of the world to respond with compassion by offering the world “the defense of 
the dignity of the person and the building up of the unity of the human family”150.  
Restoring dignity to people who have been uprooted from their homes not only by 
providing a place of asylum but by joining them in all aspects of their life to ease the 
stressful transition into the unfamiliar is at the center of refugee care and involves each 
member of the human family.   
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Discussion 
 The main goal of this study was to bridge the gap between understanding the 
background and concerns of the Kunama ethnic group and providing them with the most 
effective social services possible.  By conducting interviews with two refugees who are a 
part of this group of new arrivals, the findings supported the literature that points to both 
the resilience and the challenges that are faced by refugees.  Marco and Mikele are two 
examples of the unique challenges that are faced by the Kunama in the areas of language 
and employment, although they are farther along in English skills than many other 
Kunama.  No broader implications can be inferred from such a small sample size, but 
case studies are a valuable basis for questions to direct further research.   
 There is currently no previous research on Kunama living in the U.S., especially 
since for the most part they are a group that recently arrived.  Whether or not they are a 
group at particular risk for mental health challenges along with other African refugees 
remains to be substantiated.  Limited English skills prevented more in depth questions 
from being asked, so further research should make use of translation services if available.  
It is also important to recognize cultural differences when writing interview questions, 
because often questions that are framed from a Western perspective, such as what sort of 
job someone would like to be doing in five years time, can be confusing to the Kunama 
and may also seem trivial.  Explaining the rational behind each question will enable 
refugee participants to feel more informed about the study that is taking place and to 
allow for more accurate and representative responses.   
 This study does however raise a lot of questions about social services to refugees 
in general and whether it can differ significantly in its application to different cultural and 
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ethnic groups.  Recognizing the familiarity a certain group has with modern technology, 
urban living, and other cultural differences informs the education and support they need 
to receive upon arrival, particularly in directing that education towards getting and 
maintaining a job.  Again, explaining the rational behind employment and various 
modern amenities will allow the refugee to make more informed decisions when they are 
self-sufficient.  Truly taking the time to explore cultural differences enables refugees to 
retain a sense of dignity as people who are worthy of our time and our help.  Affirming 
the values of their own culture through mutual understanding while equipping them with 
the necessary skills to navigate a new culture provides a foundation for refugees to 
maintain their identity while still being able to become informed citizens in the U.S.   
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Conclusion 
 Understanding where people are coming from and the unique contexts from 
which they derive their identity is an integral part of delivering the most effective social 
services possible.  Throughout this paper, I have attempted to provide such a backdrop 
for the Kunama people from Eritrea, as they are, like any cultural or ethnic group, 
strongly affected by their unique history and present circumstances.  Events that have 
been long buried in history continue to make an impact on why the Kunama are a 
vulnerable group of people with a past of being marginalized, whether it was under 
Italian colonialism, British administration, the Ethiopian Federation, or their own 
government in an independent Eritrea.  Although they are a small group of people, these 
instances have given them a unique place in history at a crossroads between two nations, 
Ethiopia and Eritrea, as direct witnesses to the painful struggle that can accompany 
secession and subsequent independence.  There is always ambiguity in the midst of 
conflict, and the distinct place occupied by the Kunama throughout the border struggle 
serves as a reminder that neither side is completely devoid of fault. 
 Bringing this history with them, the Kunama have more recently embarked on a 
new phase of their journey: one of dispersion, protracted refugee crises, and resettlement 
in new and foreign countries.  Adjusting to a new culture and leaving behind all that is 
familiar is difficult for any immigrant or refugee, and always takes time and 
perseverance.  Taking the time to become familiar with the exceptional needs of each 
migrant and the wider group characteristics that have impacted his or her identity is a 
vital step in alleviating this transition and enabling social service providers to come 
alongside their clients in solidarity.  We live in a global age of protracted refugee crises, 
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with millions of people seeking outside aid to provide them with services that go beyond 
the basic necessities of food and shelter to issues of educational and language 
development, psychosocial health, physical protection, and accompaniment through times 
of great trauma, loss, and cultural adjustment.  All of these services and components must 
be present to facilitate the most effective cultural adjustment possible, and to give 
Kunama refugees the tools and resources to construct their own future, regardless of what 
country they find themselves in. 
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Map of Eritrea.  Obtained from the University of Pennsylvania Department of African 
Studies, 16 April 2008: http://www.africa.upenn.edu/CIA_Maps/Eritrea_19872.gif 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 2. 
 
 85 
 
 
Map of Eritrea’s ethnic groups.  Obtained 16 April 2008 from 
http://www.insideeritrea.com/eripeople/people01.htm 
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Interview Questions 
 
1. When did you arrive in the United States? 
 
2. What is the most different about life in the U.S. compared to back home? 
 
3. Besides English, what was the hardest adjustment to make to the U.S.?  What was 
the easiest? 
 
4. How much English did you speak when you arrived?  How much do you speak 
now? 
 
5. What do you miss most about home? 
 
6. What do you like best about the U.S.?  What do you like least? 
 
7. What has been helpful to you in adjusting to the U.S.?   
 
8. Is there anything you wish the IRC could do for you that they are not already 
doing? 
 
9. Are you currently employed?  What do you do? 
 
10. How old are you? 
 
11. What do you think you will be doing in 10 years? 
 
12. Where is your family?  Who is in the U.S., and who is in Africa? 
 
13. Do you think you will ever visit back home in the future? 
 
14. What about the U.S. makes you feel most at home? 
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Interview: Informed Consent Form 
 
I am conducting research for my Senior Thesis entitled “The Cultural Adjustment and 
Mental Health of African Refugees in the United States: The Case of the Kunama from 
Eritrea”.   
 
This research involves personal interviews with recently resettled Kunama refugees to the 
United States, to further understand their most critical cultural adjustment difficulties and 
the major differences between their home culture and the culture of the United States. 
 
As a Kunama refugee who has arrived in the United States within the past year, you are 
being asked to participate in one interview that will last approximately 20 minutes.  The 
interview will ask you about your current activities in the United States, what aspects of 
life in the United States you have found most difficult to adjust to, and how quickly and 
easily you are adapting.  There are no anticipated risks to participating in this interview; 
however, there may be unknown risks.  If emotional discomfort continues after the 
completion of the interview, family mentors will be notified and advised on possible 
counseling and therapy 
 
By choosing to participate in this interview, you will provide social service providers 
specializing in refugee resettlement with information on how to better serve you and the 
Kunama people by understanding the areas in which you require the most help.   
 
You understand that your name will be kept confidential in connection with your 
answers, but your initials may be used. 
 
During the interview procedure, you may choose to decline to answer a question at any 
time.  Participation in this study is entirely voluntary and may be discontinued at any 
time.  Withdrawal from participation will not result in denial of entitled benefits.  
 
By signing your name below, you acknowledge that you have read and understand the 
above, been free to ask questions of the researcher, consent to participation in this study, 
and confirm that you have received a copy of this informed consent document. 
 
 
Name (printed): ________________________________________________________ 
 
Signature: _____________________________________ Date: ___________________ 
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Research Summary 
 
Title: The Cultural Adjustment and Mental Health of African Refugees in the 
United States: The Case of the Kunama from Eritrea 
 
A. Introduction and Background: 
 1. Adjustment to a new culture can be a difficult experience for immigrant populations, 
but is often especially problematic for refugees dealing with previous mental trauma experienced 
in their home country prior to resettlement.  I hypothesize that as a group with little to no 
background in English, Kunama people have struggled both culturally and mentally to transition 
to a new life in the United States.   
2. As a historically oppressed ethnic minority group in Eritrea, the Kunama people have 
recently been arriving to the United States for resettlement in higher numbers.  My thesis will 
address three main topics: the history of the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea and the 
situation of the Kunama people, the refugee resettlement process from Africa to the United States, 
and the cultural adjustment and mental health of Kunama refugees after entering the United 
States. 
 
B. Specific Aims/Study Objectives:   
 1. By focusing on the this group of people from Eritrea, I seek to raise an awareness of 
the particular difficulties that this population has in both cultural and mental adjustment during 
the resettlement process, so that better and more individualized social support can be created to 
aid them.  I hope to learn about the specific cultural differences that exist between the United 
States and the Kunama, and what coping skills the Kunama people are using to adjust to these 
changes.  I also aim to uncover the greatest concerns and the areas in which Kunama refugees 
require the most help in becoming successful and active citizens in their new country.   
 
C. Materials, Methods and Analysis (quantitative and qualitative):   
 1. Data will be collected via an interview conducted in person with six different Kunama 
refugees in the Boston area.  A translator will be necessary for three of these interviews, as half of 
the sample has far superior English skills than the other half.   
 2. A structured interview will be conducted that will contain the same questions for all six 
study participants.   
 3. Each interview will last about 20 minutes.  The timeline for conducting the interviews 
will be the month of February 2008.  The whole process will take approximately three hours, to 
finish the interview with all six participants. 
 4. I will use grounded theory to analyze my data, organizing it by themes to be 
interpreted for meaning.  Because it is qualitative data using a small number of case studies, 
statistics are not necessary. 
 
D. Research Population & Recruitment Methods: 
 1. Participants must be of Kunama descent, have refugee status in the United States, and 
must have arrived within the last year.   
 2. Age must be adult, to maintain consistency among the six cases and to be old enough 
to answer the interview questions, and the race of study participants must be Kunama.  Gender is 
not important.  The number will be kept at around six to have a manageable number of 
interviews.  
 3. I chose the source of participants from volunteer work at the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) of Boston.   
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 4. Participants are already known personally to the researcher and will be asked in person 
by the researcher if they are willing to participate in the interview. 
 5. No recruitment tools are necessary. 
 
E. Informed Consent Procedure 
 1. The researcher will perform the informed consent procedure. 
 2. The researcher will be under faculty supervision, has completed the Human Participant 
Protections Education for Research Teams tutorial, and will be trained to collect qualitative data 
by the faculty supervisor.   
 3. Participants will receive an explanation of the interview procedure in both English and 
Kunama, when necessary.  Participants will be encouraged to ask questions about the procedures, 
will be asked if they understand the procedure, and will sign a written document stating their 
consent to participate in the interview. 
 
F. Confidentiality: 
 1. Data will be stored on the personal computer and in the desk of the researcher.  No one 
else will have access to the area, and a password will be used to ensure that the researcher is the 
only person with access to the computer.  The only other person who will be allowed access to 
the data is the Faculty Advisor.   
 2. Data will be stored in both hard copies and electronic copies.   
 3. In the research paper, the participant’s initials will be used, and initials only will be 
stored with the data. 
 
G. Potential Research risks or discomforts to participants: 
 1. Psychological or emotional discomfort is possible when answering questions about a 
refugee’s home country or level of distress upon resettlement.   
 2. The likelihood of psychological or emotional discomfort is minimal because of the 
generality of the interview questions.  The magnitude is expected to be slim.   
 3. The participants will be encouraged to decline to answer a question at anytime to 
reduce potential psychological or emotional discomfort, as well as being free to decline 
participation or terminate participation in the study at any time.  If discomfort continues after 
completing the interview, family mentors who work with the participants will be notified and be 
given contact information to potential counseling options. 
 
H. Potential Research Benefits to Participants: 
 1. Generalized research data will be shared with the staff of the International Rescue 
Committee (IRC) of Boston to improve their ability to work with Kunama refugees and to better 
understand their background.  Participants will directly benefit from this research through an 
improved understanding by their direct social service providers.  Participant volunteer mentors 
will also be advised as to what cultural adjustment issues need to most readily be addressed to 
focus the content of their mentor activities to better address the most urgent needs of the 
participants.  If published, this study will also contribute to societal understanding and awareness 
of the specific needs of the Kunama people and the results of this study will become available to 
other social welfare providers to Kunama refugees and improve their practices. 
 2. All the participants will benefit to some extent, as all will be matched with family 
mentors who will be made aware of their cultural needs as expressed in the study. 
       
 
 
 
